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PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATION: WHERE
IS THE LINE BETWEEN "PERSONAL
OPINION" AND PROPER ARGUMENT?
I

INTRODUCTION

Prosecutorial forensic misconduct has become front page news in
Maine.2 Since April of 1993, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has reversed convictions in three highly publicized cases based on remarks made by the prosecutor.3 In State v.
Steen," the prosecutor asked the defendant to give his opinion concerning the veracity of other witnesses and suggested in closing argument that the favorable testimony given by the defense's expert
witness resulted from the fee he had received. 5 The Law Court vacated the gross sexual assault conviction, finding that the prosecutor's questions and closing argument "clearly suggested" to the jury
that the prosecutor believed that the witnesses were lying.0 In State
v. Casella,7 the prosecutor's case was largely based on the premise
that the defendant had duped his victims.8 The Law Court vacated
the multiple count theft conviction because the prosecutor "not less
than forty-one times, asserted his opinion that Casella had lied."O In
State v. Tripp,10 the prosecutor stated in closing argument that the
victim had told the truth because he had recounted his sexual abuse
1. Forensic misconduct is defined as "any activity by the prosecutor which tends
to divert the jury from making its determination of guilt or innocence by weighing
the legally admitted evidence in a manner prescribed by law." Comment, The Nature
and Consequences of ForensicMisconduct in the Prosecutionof a Criminal Case, 54
COLUM. L Ray. 946, 949 (1954).
2. Jason Wolfe, Maine High Court Cracks Down on Prosecutors' Trial Remarks,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 8, 1994, at 1A.
3. The Casella trial was moved from Androscoggin County to Cumberland
County because of pretrial publicity in the Lewiston-Auburn area media. Brief for
Appellee at 2, State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121 (Me.), withdrawn, 629 A.2d 608 (Me.
1993) (No. CUM-92-426). The Steen rape case was a staple of the Portland area media throughout its prosecution. See, e.g., Edward D. Murphy, Rape Defendant Pleads
No Contest, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 22, 1993, at 1B; Tess Nacelewicz, Jury
Finds Bay State Man Guilty of Sexual Assault, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 2,
1992, at 4B; Tess Nacelewicz, Man Gets Five-Year Term for Rape, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Apr. 18, 1992, at 1B; Victim Files Suit Against Rapist, USM Fraternity,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Mar. 12, 1993, at lB.
4. 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
5. Id. at 148-49.
6. Id.
7. 632 A.2d 121 (Me.), withdrawn, 629 A.2d 608 (Me. 1993). For a discussion of
the history of this case, see infra note 165.
8. Id. at 124 (Rudman, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 121.
10. 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994).
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in detail that would be foreign to a nine year old.11 The Law Court
vacated the conviction, finding that the prosecutor's statement was 1a2
"personal opinion" concerning the credibility of a witness.
Whether the Law Court is just "playing semantics""3 or attempting
' runaway prosecutors,
to "reel in"14
the court's willingness to scrutinize prosecutorial statements and find impropriety could have a
profound effect on prosecutorial summation in Maine.
The Law Court's eagerness to label prosecutorial inferences as improper "personal opinion," its apparent hostility to prosecutorial use
of the term "lie" in any of its grammatical forms, and the summary
fashion in which the court has discussed these issues has left many
Maine district attorneys scratching their heads.15 The opinions fail
to establish a perceptible line dividing proper argument based on
the lawyer's analysis of the reasonable inferences permissibly drawn
from the evidence and improper summation based on personal
beliefs.
Despite pronouncements that the issue on appeal in all three
cases was the fairness of the trial,"6 the court emphasized the prosecutor's conduct, not the effect of that conduct on the jury's deliberations. This focus suggests that the court's interest is in issuing direct
warnings to the prosecutor. Disappointed that prosecutors have repeatedly ignored its previous warnings,1 7 the Law Court, in venting
its frustration, misapplied and misconstrued the personal opinion
limitation and redefined standards of review in order to sanction
11.
12.
13.
ALD,

Id. at 1319-20 n.5.
Id. at 1319.
John Healy, Court Rejects FraternityRape Verdict, PORTLAND PRESS HER-

Apr. 7, 1993 at lB.

14. Jason Wolfe, Maine High Court Cracks Down on Prosecutors'Trial Remarks,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 8, 1994, at 8A.
15. Janet Mills, District Attorney in Androscoggin, Franklin, and Oxford counties,
summed up prosecutors' puzzlement, when she said, "My confusion is, what can we
say?" Jason Wolfe, Maine High Court Cracks Down on Prosecutors' Trial Remarks,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 8, 1994, at 8A.
16. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1320 (Me. 1994) (in determining whether there is
obvious error the court looks to determine the seriousness of the injustice done to the
defendant); State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 121 (defendant's contention on appeal is
that "he was deprived a fair trial because the State repeatedly referred to him as a
'liar' during its closing argument"); State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 148 ("Steen contends
that: (1) the prosecutor's misconduct at trial denied him a fair trial . .
").
17. See e.g., State v. Marshall, 628 A.2d 1061, 1062 (Me. 1993) ("[Tlhe prosecutor
is not only a party to a criminal action, but an agent of the state, cloaked with the
responsibility of promoting justice, not just winning cases.); State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d
231, 237 (Me. 1984) ("[T]he prosecutor should refrain from argument which would
divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence . . ...
") (citing State
v. Pineau, 463 A.2d 779, 780 (Me. 1983) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

§ 5.8(d) (1971))); State v. Reilly, 446

A.2d 1125, 1128 (Me. 1982) ("With dismaying frequency we have been called upon to
determine the propriety of prosecutorial tactics.").
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prosecutors for their continued indiscretions. The court's eagerness
to censure prosecutors threatens to restrict closing argument and

undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system by creating the perception that convicted criminals are escaping incarcera-

tion because of technicalities. 18
This Comment will examine these recent decisions. First, the
Comment will explore the role of the prosecutor in closing argument. It will then canvass the limitations on prosecutorial argument
imposed by the Law Court. Finally, this Comment will conclude that
the opinions in Steen, Casella, and Tripp represent a departure
from these judicially established limitations and unduly restrict the

prosecutor's ability to cross-examine the defendant and raise legitimate inferences concerning the credibility of a defendant who has

testified on his own behalf.19
1I. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
The prosecutor in a criminal trial occupies a unique position in
the American adversarial system of criminal justice. As leaders of
the law enforcement community, prosecutors must use their advocacy skills to wage "war against crime."2 0 As elected representatives
of the state, prosecutors have a duty to protect the rights of all of
the state's citizens, including the accused. 21 These competing objec18. The tickler in a Portland Press Herald article exemplifies this perception:
"Justices have ordered new trials for people convicted of serious crimes because of
improper statements." Jason Wolfe, Maine High Court Cracks Down on Prosecutors'
Trial Remarks, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 8, 1994, at IA. The fact that after
reversal in the three cases discussed in this Comment none of the defendants faced
any additional incarceration further reinforces this perception. In State v. Steen, Jon
Steen pleaded no contest to the same charge and was sentenced to time served. Edward D. Murphy, Rape Defendant Pleads No Contest, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July
22, 1993, at lB. In State v. Casella, Anthony Casella, reached a plea bargain with the
State, agreeing to plead guilty to two counts of felony theft and two reduced charges
of misdemeanor theft in exchange for a sentence of time served. Stephen M. Greenlee, Home Deal Turns Bitter for Couple, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 5. 1993, at
10B. In State v. Tripp, on retrial for the three vacated counts, a jury deliberated for
less than an hour before acquitting Linwood Tripp. Maine's Evening News at Six
(WGME television broadcast, March 23, 1994) (notes of Author).
19. While this Comment's primary concern is expressions of personal opinion in
closing argument, because the Law Court in State v.Steen and State v. Tripp found
that the prosecutor's cross-examination technique improperly advanced her personal
opinion that the defendant had lied, this Comment will also consider the propriety of
the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant in the discussion of these two
cases.

20.

AimecAN BAR ASSOClATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CIM.uNA JusIcE.

STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

77

(1974).

21. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1992) ("A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648.49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that it is not the function of prosecutor to "tack as many skins" as possi-
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hand on the throttle
tives force the prosecutor "to operate with one
22
and the other poised firmly on the brake.

While codes of professional responsibility and conduct exhort the
criminal defense attorney to zealously represent each individual client, 23 the legal profession has long recognized that the special nature
of the prosecutor's function requires the application of a different
standard.24 The touchstone enunciated by the courts and the profession is most simply stated as a requirement to do justice.2 By this
critical but vague precept prosecutors must evaluate performance
20
and weigh decisions at each stage of the criminal trial process.
ble to the wall, but to "vindicate the rights of the people as expressed in the laws and
to give the accused a fair trial"); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1966)
(White, J., dissenting) ("Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the
guilty and to make sure they do not convict the innocent."); State v. Wood, 127 Me.
197, 200, 142 A. 728, 730 (1928) (holding that the state is not endeavoring to prove
the respondent guilty, but to ascertain whether he is guilty or not).
22. Henry B. Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Closing Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 22 (1973).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1992) (providing that
a lawyer should act "with zeal"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND

CODE

OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT EC 7-1 (1986) (providing that a lawyer's duty is to re-

present his client zealously); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION

FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-1.2(b) (3d. ed. 1993) (stating that defense counsel
must serve client with "courage and devotion").
24. "The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client." American Bar
Association, ProfessionalResponsibility:Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.BA. J.
1159, 1218 (1958).
25. This precept traces its origins to Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
In Berger, Justice Sutherland reversed the defendant's conviction and issued a strong
proclamation that has become a benchmark of prosecutorial conduct:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88.
The Law Court has favorably cited Berger on several occasions. See, e.g., State v.
Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1128 (Me. 1982) (listing other instances where the Law Court
has discussed Berger); State v. Dana, 406 A.2d 83, 88 (Me. 1979) (quoting language
above); State v. Wyman, 270 A.2d 460, 463 (Me. 1970) (prosecutor's duty to bring
about a just conviction). See also, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8
cmt. (1992) (stating that prosecutors are "minister[s] of justice"); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT EC 7-13 (1986) (providing that prosecutors must "seek justice").
26. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice:
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The American Bar Association has translated the "do justice"
standard into guidelines that establish the bounds of the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury. 27 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, provide:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all
reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor
should not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury
as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or
opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or
the guilt of the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to appeal
to the prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would dim u
vert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
While Maine has no standards applicable solely to prosecutors, the
American Bar Association standards are consistent with the Maine
Bar Rules that contain similar language 0 and Maine case law. "0
Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,44 VAND. L. REv. 45 (1991).
27. At its 1992 mid-year meeting, the ABA approved substantial revisions to the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. Included in these revisions was the adoption of
a new Standard 3-1.1 entitled "The Function of the Standards":
These standards are intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct
and performance. They are not intended to be used as criteriafor judicial
evaluation of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor to determine the validity of the conviction. They may or may not be relevant in such judicial
evaluation depending upon the circumstances.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTON FUNCTION AND DEFZNSE FuNcTION 3-1.1 cmt. (3d ed. 1993). This amendment makes Standard 3-5.8, Argument to
the Jury, even more aspirational and relegates its operative effect to something more
akin to an ethical imperative. Appellate courts have repeatedly cited to the ABA

Standards as a yardstick by which to measure the prosecutor's conduct. It seems incongruous to promulgate standards that are intended to "guide professional conduct
and performance" and then expressly limit their use by appellate courts which are
evaluating the performance of the prosecutors. While the commentary to the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice has always indicated that the guidelines were not
drafted as "per se rules applicable to post-conviction procedures," even the rules'
drafters realize that the rules may be useful for this purpose. See, e.g., AmRcAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPI.ATION, at 64-65 (1974) (stating that while the "[s]tandards may also be useful in providing a yardstick for the
evaluation of the effectiveness of a lawyer's conduct when it is called into question by
an attack on the validity of a conviction because of his performance" their primary
impact is intended to be on the conduct of the individual prosecutor). The adoption
by the ABA of an explicit standard limiting the applicability of the guidelines can
only be attributed to lobbying by a prosecutor's bar that had grown tired of being
beaten by the judiciary with a "yardstick" the lawyers themselves had created.
28. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DmEENsE
FUNCTION

3-5.8 (3d ed. 1993).

29. See, e.g., Ma. BAR R 3.7(e)(2):
In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not-
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These criteria acknowledge the substantial influence the prosecutor wields. The prosecutor's status is a product of both public attitudes and criminal procedure. The prosecutor has the power to determine whom to charge, when and with whom to plea bargain, and
even what sentence to recommend to the sentencing judge. "At the
local community level, the American prosecutor has more control
over the lives and liberty of the individual citizen than any other
single person or governmental agency in the United States.",1 The
prosecutors' powers and status as elected officials 3 2 who represent
the interests of the state tend to lead jurors to imbue their comments with a sense of trust and expectation of impartiality.3 " The
criminal trial's procedural organization also results in the jury's
placing even greater emphasis on prosecutors' remarks. Prosecutors
make their closing arguments first and, through rebuttal of the defense's closing, have the final opportunity to influence the jury. s'
Improper arguments by prosecutors may not only infringe on enumerated rights of the defendant, such as the privilege against selfincrimination 5 and the right to confront witnesses, " but also may
(i) Intentionally misquote to a judge, jury, or tribunal the language of a
book, statute, or decision or, with knowledge of its invalidity and without
disclosing such knowledge, cite as authority, a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional;
(ii) State or allude to any matter that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case or will not be supported by admissible
evidence;
(iii) Ask any question that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other
person;
(iv) Assert personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying
as a witness;
(v) Assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused; but a lawyer may argue, on the lawyer's analysis of
the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters
stated therein ....
30. See infra notes 41-114 and accompanying text. See also State v. Pineau, 463
A.2d 779, 781 (Me. 1983).
31.

DAVID M. NIssMAN & ED HAGAN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, at 2 (1982).

32. Generally, in Maine, voters elect district attorneys for four year terms. See
ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 251 (West Supp. 1993-1994). Only when vacancies
occur for reasons other than the expiration of the term, may the governor appoint a
substitute district attorney to serve until the next biennial election. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit.

30-A, §§ 252, 253 (West Supp. 1993-1994).

33. See State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 18 (Me. 1983) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (lst Cir. 1977) ("the representative of the government
approaches the jury with the inevitable asset of tremendous credibility .
")).
34. See ME. R. CRIM. P. 30(a): "The attorney for the state shall argue first. The
attorney for each defendant shall then argue. The attorney for the state shall then be
allowed time for rebuttal."
35. ME. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by
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deny the defendant's fundamental right to due process.37
Restrictions designed to temper prosecutors' influence and power
do not dilute their responsibility to use closing argument as effec-

tively as defense counsel. Closing argument is the prosecutor's last
and best chance to tie together all of the evidence that supports the
case against the defendant. Operating within the parameters of the
evidence presented, prosecutors may draw upon their oratorical
skills and creative impulses 8 to "summarize the case from the per-

spective of [their] interpretation of all the evidence in the case and
the inferences to be drawn therefrom."3 9 To meet the obligations of

their office during argument before the jury, prosecutors must earnestly and vigorously advance their cases, while at all times respect-

ing the rights of the accused by avoiding language that would cause
the jury to decide the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the
the accused and counsel to the accused, or either, at the election of the
accused;
To demand the nature and cause of the accusation, and have a copy
thereof;
To be confronted by the witnesses against the accused;
To have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in favor of the
accused;
To have a speedy, public and impartial trial, and, except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of the vicinity. The accused shall not be
compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by judgment of that person's peers or the law of the land.
US. CONST. amend. V provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
36. See ME CONST. supra note 35. US. CONsT. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
37. MR. CONST. art. 1, § 6-A provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of
the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of his civil rights or be discriminated against in
the exercise thereof. See also supra note 35.
38. 1 CLUCHEY & SErrzINGER, MAINE CRm uAL PRAcricE, § 30.2 at V-99 (1992):
("While counsel may be creative in argument, creativity must be exercised on the
evidence that has been placed before the fact finder.").
39. State v. Liberty, 498 A.2d 257, 259 (Me. 1985).
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basis of anything but the facts in evidence. 40
III. "THE BOUNDS OF FAIRNESS": PERMISSIBLE PROSECUTORIAL
ARGUMENT IN MAINE

The Law Court has imposed a variety of limitations on the prosecution's closing argument. These proscriptions can be categorized
into four groups: arguments expressing personal beliefs or opinions,
arguments designed to inflame the emotions of the jury, arguments
based on facts outside the record, and arguments that attack the
defendant's defense strategy.
In its eagerness to correct prosecutorial missteps, the Law Court
in Steen, Casella, and Tripp labeled as "personal opinion" remarks
by the prosecutor that should have been analyzed under other existing limitations on prosecutorial argument. Specifically, in Casella,
the Law Court should have found that portions of the prosecutor's
argument were designed to inflame the jury. In Tripp, the Law
Court should have identified elements of the prosecutor's summation as an attempt to argue facts not in evidence. Because none of
the prosecutorial arguments in these three cases involved comments
attacking the defense strategy, the 1limitations on this type of argument will not be discussed herein.
40.

See, e.g., United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 452 (1st Cir. 1970)
Essentially, the prosecutor is to argue the case. He may discuss the evidence, the warrantable inferences, the witnesses, and their credibility. He
may talk about the duties of the jury, the importance of the case, and anything else that is relevant. He is not to interject his personal beliefs. The
prosecutor is neither a witness, a mentor, nor a thirteenth juror ....
He
must not appeal to passion or prejudice of the jury directly, or, by the introduction of irrelevant matter, indirectly.
For an extreme view of the limits of prosecutorial argument see Albert W. Alschuler,
Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 Tax. L. REv. 629, 636
(1972), who states that "[tithe prosecutor should not think of oratory as part of his
job at all. He should avoid the 'glow and flow of the heat of forensics' and should, in
fact, strive for more 'Chesterfeldian politeness.'" (citations omitted).
41. The following is a synopsis of the proscriptions pertaining to attacks on the
defendant established by the Law Court. A prosecutor may not comment on the defendant's refusal to testify. State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490, 7 A. 269 (1886). The Law
Court has held as a matter of law that any direct comment on the failure of a criminal defendant to become a witness, or any indirect comment that suggests that a jury
must accept the state's evidence as true because it is undenied by a criminal defendant, is never harmless error. State v. Tibbetts, 299 A.2d 883 (Me. 1973). But see State
v. Ingalls, 544 A.2d 1272 (Me. 1988) (improper prosecutorial comment on defendant's
failure to testify not grounds for reversal merely because a single juror may have been
influenced); State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397 (Me. 1981) (ambiguous prosecutorial remarks that could easily be construed by the jury as a comment on defendant's failure
to testify are not deemed harmful as matter of law, but to be deemed harmless, state
must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the record contains no evidence
that would support acquittal). Nor may a prosecutor argue an inference from the
defendant's failure to call a witness. State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774 (Me. 1985). Finally
the prosecutor may not disparage the defendant's defense strategy. State v. McDon-

19941

PROSECUTORIAL SUMMATION

A. Personal Opinion
The principle concern behind prohibiting prosecutors from offering their opinions in closing argument is to preclude the prosecutor
from exploiting the power and credibility of the office to manipulate
the jury's assessment of the evidence. This manipulation manifests
in two ways. First, prosecutors may attempt to use their personal
opinion to draw upon the office's inherent credibility in order to bolster the case. In its simplest form such an argument may be stated
as "This is true, because I say it is true." This places the credibility
of counsel at issue instead of the guilt of the defendant. This shortcircuits the fact-finding function of the trial by telling the jury that
prosecutors' opinions are due determinative weight because they are
2
the state's representatives.

Second, prosecutors may imply that their opinions are based on
information unavailable to the jury, and should be believed because
of the prosecutors' superior knowledge. This argument can be paraphrased, "This is so, because I know a lot more about this case than
you do (but I can't tell you)." The jury may regard such expressions
of the prosecutor's personal beliefs as the testimony of a witness or
the opinion of an expert.43 This situation may be especially damagad, 472 A.2d 424 (Me. 1984) (while the prosecutor may attack the sufficiency of defense evidence, he is not at liberty to disparage the legal principles upon which the
defense is based).
42. United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1981).
43. The development of Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v) indicates that its drafters
intended this rule to proscribe argument where the attorney offers her opinion to
inject additional "evidence" into the jury's deliberations.
Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v) states:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not: (v) Assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the
guilt or innocence of an accused; but a lawyer may argue, on the lawyer's
analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the
matters stated therein.
ME. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(v). Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v) represents a verbatim adoption
of ABA Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(4). See ME. BAR R. 3.7(e) reporter's note ("Rule
3.7(e) sets forth the minimal standards of professional behavior before a court or tribunal. Paragraph (1) states positive mandates and paragraph (2) contains prohibitions ....
Subparagraphs (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) of paragraph (2) are identical to
DR 7-106(C)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) respectively."). While the drafters of the Maine
Bar Rules chose to divorce the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility from their accompanying Canons and Ethical Consideration when they
incorporated the ABA Disciplinary Rules into Rule 3, because of Maine Bar Rule
3.7(e)(2)(v)'s derivation from the Model Code, its scope and application is best understood by reviewing it in light of the applicable Disciplinary Rule, Ethical Consideration, and Canon. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RnsPoNsmu.rrv Preamble (1983)
(stating that interpretative guidance in application of Disciplinary Rules is garnered
from "the basic principles embodied in the Canons" and "in the objectives reflected
in the Ethical Considerations.").
Disciplinary Rule 7-106 is part of Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional
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ing to the defendant when prosecutors suggest their assessments are
grounded in additional convincing evidence of guilt not introduced

at trial.
The Law Court has condemned closing arguments that attempt to

exploit the prosecutor's credibility or imply knowledge of facts not
before the jury on the grounds that they are expressions of personal
opinion.4 4 In State v. Tomah,4 5 the prosecutor attempted to use his
personal opinion in closing argument to bolster his case. The prosecutor told the jury that he believed the police testified professionally, that he thought the tracking dog did a good job, that he knew
that people did not forget the names of those with whom they were
in the service, and that he thought he had stretched the defendant's
credibility to the breaking point.46 The Law Court found the prosecutor's statements erroneous because the remarks might have diResponsibility. Canon 7 states "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7
(1983). Thus, the general concept governing the application of DR 7-106, and by implication, ME. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(v) is one of zealous advocacy.
Even more illuminating is Ethical Consideration 7-24 which states:
In order to bring about just and informed decisions, evidentiary and procedural rules have been established by tribunals to permit the inclusion of
relevant evidence and argument and the exclusion of all other considerations. The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil
litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not a proper subject
for argument to the trier of fact. It is improper as to factual matters because admissible evidence possessed by the lawyer should be presented as
sworn testimony.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSION RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-24 (1983). This consideration indi-

cates that the problematic "personal opinion" that the Disciplinary Rule prohibits is
an opinion that introduces through argument additional unsworn evidence.
Finally, the representative source cited in Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(4) itself reinforces the intent that the rule's application was to limit solely those opinions that, in
effect, allowed the attorney to "testify" to the jury. The Model Code cites People v.
Dukes, 146 N.E.2d 14, 17-18 (Il1. 1957), where the opinion concluded:
The record in the case at the bar was silent concerning the qualities and
character of the deceased. It is especially improper in addressing the jury in
a murder case, for the prosecuting attorney to make reference to his knowledge of the good qualities of the deceased where there is no evidence in the
record bearing upon his character . . . . A prosecutor should never inject
into his argument evidence not introduced at trial. (emphasis added).
Thus, the thrust of DR 7-106(C)(4) and Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v) was and is to
advance a general standard of conduct: zealous advocacy. The rule only limits this
advocacy where the attorney attempts to go beyond the bounds of established procedural and evidentiary law by introducing personal opinions that the jury might assume were based on knowledge outside that which was presented at trial.
44. State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Me. 1989) (citing United States v. Cresta,
825 F.2d 538, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Impemba v. United States,
486 U.S. 1042 (1988)).
45. 586 A.2d 1267 (Me. 1991).
46. Id. at 1269.
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verted the jury from its fact-finding mission.' 7
The Law Court has also held improper, statements indicating the
prosecutor's personal belief in the defendant's guilt " and remarks
representing the prosecutor's opinion as to the strength of the
state's case.49 Prosecutorial comments that begin with phrases such
as "I believe" or "I think" are improper.5 0 While the court expressed
the opinion that jurors are sophisticated enough to understand that
not every remark prefaced by these words is an expression of perrecognize that "I besonal opinion,51 the prudent prosecutor will
2
lieve" is a "dirty verb" better off avoided.
Equally prohibited are expressions of personal opinion concerning
the credibility of a witness. The weight to be given a witness's testimony is an assessment for the jury. The Law Court has condemned
prosecutorial argument that either vouched for the veracity8

3

or im-

plied the falsity of testimony when the evidence did not support
drawing such an inference.5
The Law Court has recognized the difference between prosecutors'
statements of their belief in the defendant's guilt and their assessments that the evidence presented proves the defendant's guilt. The
Law Court has deemed the latter argument wholly appropriate.
While it is ultimately the jury's job to draw inferences, the Law
Court has allowed the prosecutor the latitude to "argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to
the matters stated therein .

. . ."5

There is nothing improper, the

court has found, about prosecutors attempting to persuade juries to
draw an inference unfavorable to the defense, so long as the conclusion is based on evidence presented during the trial and not on the
47. Id. at 1269-70.
48. State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d at 1187 (prosecutor said he believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the right person); State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1128
(Me. 1982) (prosecutor argued defense counsel knew defendant was not telling truth).
49. State v. Tomah, 586 A.2d at 1269 (prosecutor told jury that if they sat on a
jury for twenty years they would never see a more rock solid case).
50. State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d at 1187 (in opening statement pro3ecutor said he
believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the right person); State v.
Dube, 522 A.2d 904, 908 (Me. 1987) (prosecutor said he thought the state's witness
was a very good witness).
51. State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d at 1187 (jurors read nothing more into "I believe"
than they read into the prosecutor's decision to prosecute).
52. United States v. Tropeano, 476 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
839 (1973).
53. State v. Griatzky, 587 A.2d 234, 236 (Me. 1991) (prosecutor told jury that police officers were telling the truth); State v. Boyd, 401 A.2d 157, 161 (Me. 1979) (prosecutor opined that witness's testimony was credible).
54. State v. Diaz, 556 A.2d 1098, 1099 n.6 (Me. 1989) (prosecutor said defendant's
expert could care less what the truth was and said what the defendant wanted him to
say); State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983) (prosecutor asserted that defendant
had lied).
55. State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 9 (Me. 1989) (quoting M&. BAR P.3.7(e)(2)(v)).
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prosecutor's personal convictions. Based on this analysis the court
has permitted arguments in which the prosecutor called the testimony of defense witnesses "unbelievable" 5 and described
the de57
fendant as an "admitted thief and admitted liar.
B.

Arguments Designed to Inflame Jury Emotions

Prosecutorial argument aimed at inflaming the passions and sympathies of the jury are the paradigm example of prosecutorial mis-

conduct in closing argument. Emotional argument introduces irrational and irrelevant issues into jury deliberations. This distracts the

jury from their intended fact-finding mission and increases the
probability of a verdict based on an emotional response rather than
on a dispassionate determination of guilt or innocence.
A common means employed by prosecutors to inflame the jury's
emotion is abusive name-calling. This type of attack can be highly
effective"8 and the legal digests are full of case law finding these colorful terms both proper and improper.5 Like other forms of
prosecutorial misconduct, disparaging remarks are impermissible because they lighten the state's burden of proof by engendering in the

jury feelings of prejudice, fear, and loathing towards the defendant.
The remarks are also objectionable because they disturb the deco-

rum of the court proceedings 0 and the dignity of the prosecutorial
office.6 ' The Law Court has found that disparaging remarks not

based on the evidence are impermissible. For instance, in State v.
Boyd, 62 the Law Court held that the state's characterization of the
defendant as a "petty thief" denied him a fair trial.6 3 The Law
Court has also stated that it does not condone the use of pejorative
56. State v. Johnson, 472 A.2d 1367, 1373 (Me. 1983).
57. State v. Pendexter, 495 A.2d 1241 (Me. 1985). See also State v. Harnish, 560
A.2d at 9.
58. A study conducted by Duke University and the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration concluded that prosecutors who use tough, vivid, abusive, and direct
language attain a higher conviction rate than those who are polite in their delivery.
See NAT. L. J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 6, col 1.
59. See, e.g., Thomas M. Flemming, Annotation, Negative Characterizationor
Description of Defendant, by Prosecutor During Summation of Criminal Trial, as
Grounds for Reversal, New Trial or Mistrial, Modern Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 8 (1991).
60. See ME.BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(vi) ("In appearing in a professional capacity before a
tribunal, a lawyer shall not: Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct that is
degrading to the tribunal.").
61. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
prosecutor's obligation to desist from the use of pejorative language ... is every bit
as solemn as his obligation to attempt to bring the guilty to account."); United States
v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 123 (1st Cir.) ("[Pejorative] comments warrant especial condemnation when uttered by the government's attorney. . ."); cert. denied 484 U.S.
855 (1987); United States v. Williams, 496 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir. 1974) (disparaging
comments inconsistent with dignity of government).
62. 401 A.2d 157 (Me. 1979).
63. Id. at 161.
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terms "such as 'liar"' to describe a witness."
The Law Court has condemned all prosecutorial tactics designed
to turn a criminal trial into "a trial by combat rather than a civilized
proceeding."85 Further, it has denounced prosecutorial summation
that appeals to jurors' sympathies through the use of emotionally
charged and inflammatory remarks. 6 In particular, the Law Court
has deemed improper those prosecutorial arguments that appealed
to racial prejudice, 67 manufactured sympathy for the victim,08 engendered animosity towards the defendant and appealed to the
jury's self-interest, 9 and presented the jury with issues broader than
70
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
C. Arguing Facts Not in Evidence
A jury, in reaching its determination of guilt or innocence, is limited to considering those facts brought out as evidence during counsels' presentation of their case. 71 The prosecutor should not use
summation to put before the jury facts not presented in evidence.
Argument that goes beyond the record makes the prosecutor a witness. This unsworn testimony, though worthless as a matter of law,
may carry great weight with the jury because of the jury's regard for
the prosecutor and may prejudice the fairness of the trial.72 Prosecutors, therefore, must confine their arguments to the facts proved by
direct evidence, to fair and reasonable inferences arising from these
64. State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129 n.2 (Me. 1982).
65. State v. Haberski, 449 A.2d 373, 378 (Me. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.,
Haberski v. Maine, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983).
66. State v. Burgoyne, 452 A.2d 393, 396 (Me. 1982).
67. State v. Dana, 406 A.2d 83, 86 (Me. 1979) (defense contended that prosecutor's reference to defendant's Native American heritage was intended to incite racial
prejudice).
68. State v. Greene, 512 A.2d 330, 334 (MIe. 1986) (prosecutor referred to complainant as "this poor little girl, eleven-year-old victim"); State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d
742, 750-51 (Me. 1984) (prosecutor asked the jury to "consider, also, that [the victim]
had rights too"); State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 511 (Me. 1981) (prosecutor said "[the
victim] may be an elderly man, may not be handsome to everyone except to those
who loved him, but that doesn't give [the defendant] the right to kill him, to treat
him like a dog, and to have no more thought about it than he would if he'd crushed
an insect.").
69. State v. Berkley, 567 A.2d 915, 921-22 (Me. 1989) (prosecutor argued defendant's arson affected juror's insurance rates).
70. State v. Pineau, 463 A.2d 779, 781 (Me. 1983) (prosecutor in an operating
under the influence prosecution presented jury with a hypothetical that injected extraneous issues of fear and highway safety into deliberation).
71. United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 579 (1st Cir. 1981).
72. See M. BAR R. 3.7(e)(2)(iv) ("In appearing in a professional capacity before a
tribunal, a lawyer shall not(iv) Assert personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying as a

witness[.]").

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:241

facts, and to the issues of the case.7 s
Based on this general rule the Law Court has found it improper
for the prosecutor to move beyond the facts in evidence to matters
outside the record. In State v. Vigue 7 4 the prosecutor argued that
his experience in law enforcement had taught him "the way
criminals always work."' 75 The Law Court found this line of argument improper because "by asserting special knowledge of a criminal modus operandi, the prosecutor was, in effect, supplying the
jury with additional evidence .. . ."76 The Law Court has also
stated that it will "not condone" prosecutorial reference to prior
consistent statements of a state witness not offered in evidence because such remarks go beyond the record." Nor may the prosecutor
refer in summation to what an absent witness would have testified. 8
In addition to prohibiting the prosecutor, in closing argument, from
referring to matters not in the trial record, the Law Court has also
disapproved of the prosecutor misstating the substantative evidence
actually admitted 79 and the applicable law. 0
While prosecutors are limited to argument based on the evidence
presented, they are not "restricted to the difficult if not impossible
task of providing verbatim renditions of all testimony alluded to."8 1
Prosecutors are free to marshall the evidence and reasonably drawn
inferences to prove the state's case. Their arguments must be limited to the evidence because forays outside the evidence make prosecutors powerful "witnesses" buoyed by the authority and prestige of
the position.
IV.

JUDIciAL RESPONSE TO IMPROPER ARGUMENT

Even when the Law Court determines that a prosecutor's argument has travelled into forbidden terrain, there is no certainty that
it will vacate the defendant's conviction. The parameters of the
prosecutor's argument are further shaped by the actions of defense
counsel and the error's prejudicial impact in light of all the circum73. State v. Viger, 392 A.2d 1080 (Me. 1978) (citing United States v. Quinn, 467
F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1972)).
74. 420 A.2d 242 (Me. 1980).
75. Id. at 246.
76. Id. at 247. See also State v. Maclean, 560 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Me. 1989) (it was
error for prosecutor to argue that defendant had been drinking "all day" when no
evidence had been introduced to support this contention); State v. Marr, 551 A.2d
456, 458 (Me. 1988) (in a case where the state had presented no evidence of the effect
of sexual abuse on young children, the prosecutor improperly discussed behavioral
patterns of children subject to abuse).
77. State v. Terrio, 442 A.2d 537, 543 (Me. 1982).
78. State v. Prudenzano, 365 A.2d 418, 420 n.4 (Me. 1976).
79. State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d 130, 137 (Me. 1985) (prosecutor referred to a demon-

strative aid as evidence).
80.
81.

State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860, 865 (Me. 1983).
State v. Doughty, 554 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1989).
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stances of the trial. The Law Court evaluates the record for circumstances that may cause the court to stay its hand. Among the factors
the court considers are the absence of objection by defense counsel
to the prosecutorial remark complained of on appeal and the presence of circumstances that render any error harmless.
Generally, the Law Court has liberally applied these doctrines and
refused to vacate convictions when the misconduct did not jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial. 2 The court recognized a distinction between improper argument that violated a defendant's
right to a fair trial and improper prosecutorial conduct that exceeded the ethical bounds of acceptable professional conduct and required the court to rebuke the offending prosecutor, but did not require vacating the verdict.8 3 The Law Court only granted a new trial
in those cases in which the prosecutor's misconduct, misstatement,
or error prejudiced the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. In
Steen, Casella, and Tripp, the court compounded its misapplication
of the personal opinion limitation by not applying the level of deference traditionally accorded under the doctrines discussed below.
A. Absence of Objection by Defense
While the court has placed limitations on the scope of the prosecutor's argument, it has also recognized that the prosecutor, like
other counsel, must be allowed to engage in vigorous advocacy when
addressing the merits of the case in closing argument. In Rolfe v.
Rumford,84 the Law Court stated that in closing argument
[t]he largest and most liberal freedom of speech is allowed, and the
law protects [counsel] in it. The right of discussing the merits of
the cause, both as to the law and the facts, is unabridged. The
range of discussion is wide. He may be heard in argument upon
every question of law. In his addresses to the jury, it is his privilege
to descant upon the facts proved, or admitted in the pleadings; to
arraign the conduct of the parties; impugn, excuse, justify or condemn motives, so far as they are developed in evidence, assail the
credibility of witnesses, when it is impeached by direct evidence, or
by the inconsistency or incoherence of their testimony, their manner of testifying, their appearance on the stand, or by circum82. See infra notes 95 and 107-11 for illustrative cases.
83. See State v. Dube, 522 A.2d 904, 911 (Me. 1987):
No one should take our present affirmation as an endorsement of all aspects of the District Attorney's conduct now attacked by Dube's appellate
counsel. Our affirmance means only that we find nothing in that conduct,
when examined under the established rules of appellate review, that vitiates
the validity and basic fairness of the jury's verdict declaring Dube guilty as
charged. It means only that setting aside Dube's convictions in these circumstances is too high a price for the public to pay for improprieties com-

mitted by the District Attorney during the trial.
84.

66 Me. 564 (1877).
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stances. His illustrations may be as various as the resources of his
genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learning can
make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit, or wings to his
imagination.85
The Law Court has given the prosecutor license to argue, as expected by the jury, for the guilt of the defendant without couching
her argument in neutral terms. The prosecutor's closing argument,
however, is not without limitation. The scope and extent of summation is within the presiding trial court judge's control.88
If a prosecutor's summation transcends the bounds of proper argument, the burden is upon defense counsel to object at the earliest
opportunity.8 7 Recognizing that an immediate objection by defense
counsel calls the jury's attention to the prosecutor's remark and may
cause the jury to place even more emphasis on the prosecutor's comment, the Law Court has indicated that the error is also preserved
for appeal when the defendant immediately makes his position
known out of the presence of the jury.8 8 By properly objecting, defense counsel gives the trial court the greatest opportunity to correct
the error and allow a determination of the case on its merits.89 Failure to raise an objection will cause the appellate court to review the
alleged improprieties only for obvious error.8 0
85. Id. at 566-67 (citations omitted). See also State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 68 A.
454 (1907), error dismissed sub noma. Martel v. Maine, 218 U.S. 666 (1910):
As is permitted to the debater in parliamentary contests, the legal advocate may employ wit, satire, invective, and imaginative illustration in his
argument before the jury, both in civil and criminal trials, but in this the
license is strictly confined to the domain of facts in evidence. This rule of
the limitation of his privilege is so often violated by the lawyer in the excitement of trials, and by reason of the temptation to which he is exposed
by the importance of the interest which he represents to become a partisan
Id. at 455.
86. State v. Liberty, 498 A.2d 257, 260 (Me. 1985) (trial court has discretion to
ensure the fair and orderly conduct of trial); State v. Dana, 406 A.2d 83, 86 (Me.
1979) (appellate court should review ruling by an experienced trial justice with restraint and caution); State v. Viger, 392 A.2d 1080, 1084 (Me. 1978) (scope and extent
of oral argument is within the sound discretion of the trial judge); Young v. Carignan,
152 Me. 332, 337, 129 A.2d 216 (1957) (discretionary authority of presiding justice to
control argument is firmly established); Crosby v. Maine Central R.R., 69 Me. 418,
423 (1879) (within presiding judge's discretion to set scope of argument).
87. State v. Watson, 63 Me. 128, 138 (1873).
88. State v. Tibbets, 299 A.2d 883, 891 n.8 (Me. 1973) (motion for mistrial protected point for appeal).
89. See State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231, 237 (Me. 1984); State v. McKeough, 300
A.2d 755, 757 (Me. 1973); State v. Boisvert, 236 A.2d 419, 422 (Me. 1967); State v.
Smith, 140 Me. 255, 284, 37 A.2d 246, 258 (1944).
90. See, e.g., State v. Varney, 560 A.2d 565, 566 (Me. 1989); State v. Hebert, 480
A.2d 742, 750 (Me. 1984); State v. Langley, 242 A.2d 688, 690 (Me. 1968). But see
State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1128-30 (Me. 1982) (noting the lack of defense objection to prosecutor's argument, but then proceeding to address the merits of the issue
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Obvious errors are "errors or defects affecting substantial rights"
that, because of their severity and potential to damage an accused's
ability to receive a fair trial, may be noticed by the reviewing court
absent an objection.9 1 Functionally, obvious errors have been defined not as mere technical errors or the "ordinary backfires" of trial
but as "blockbusters" that undermine the fundamental fairness of
the trial.92 The Law Court has articulated this higher standard ' of3
recognition for obvious error as the phrase "manifest injustice. w
Accordingly, "to prevail [under the obvious error standard] an appellant must demonstrate that he suffered a significantly higher
level of prejudice . . ." than required where the error was properly
preserved." In many cases where the defendant failed to object to
the prosecutor's improper comment, the Law Court has used the obvious error doctrine to uphold the defendant's conviction because
the impermissible comment did not rise to the level of "manifest
injustice." 95
B.

The Harmless Error Rule

When the defense counsel properly objects and preserves the
prosecutor's error, the Law Court attempts to determine whether
the error influenced the jury to stray from its responsibility to be
fair and unbiased. Rule 52(a) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure embodies this requirement.9
Grounded in judicial efficiency and economy, the harmless error
doctrine's objective is to "free criminal procedure from unnecessary
technicality. ' 97 With respect to prosecutorial forensic misconduct,
the purpose of harmless error inquiry undertaken by the court is to
ascertain whether it is "highly probable that the jury's determinaunder what seems to be a preserved error standard).
91. ME. R. CaRm P. 52(b): "Obvious Error. Obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court."
92. United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 99-100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
844 (1987).
93. See State v. Greene, 512 A.2d 330, 334 (Me. 1986); State v. Spearin, 463 A.2d
727, 731 (Me. 1983). For other terms used by the Law Court to describe obvious error
see 2 CLUCHEY & SErrZINGER, supra note 38, § 52.1 at IX-133 (1992).
94. State v. Dube, 522 A.2d 904, 907 (Me. 1987).
95. See, e.g., State v. Shackleford, 634 A.2d 1292, 1295 (Me. 1993); State v. Marshall, 628 A.2d 1061, 1062 (Me. 1993); State v. Varney, 560 A.2d 565, 566 (Me. 1989);
State v. Hebert, 480 A.2d 742, 750 (Me. 1984); State v. Farris, 420 A.2d 928, 935 (Me.
1980); State v. Pullen, 266 A.2d 222, 228-29 (Me. 1970).
96. M&. R. CRmL P. 52. Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) states(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
97.

3 GLAssmAN,

§ 52.1 at 428 (1966).
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tion. . . was unaffected by the prosecutor's comments."98 In reaching its decision, the Law Court evaluates the improper conduct
against the backdrop of the entire trial to determine how the misconduct affected the jurors.9 9 In assessing the prosecutorial comment, findings of harmless error are common since the Law Court
has stated that it will "not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning
from the plethora of less damaging interpretations."1 0
The court frequently invokes the harmless error doctrine when
the trial judge issues a curative instruction. In many cases where an
objection is made, the Law Court considers the prosecutor's transgression "cured" if the trial court sustains the objection and either
instructs the jury to disregard the argument, rebukes the prosecutor,
or both. 10 1 The primary determining factor with regard to the efficacy of the curative instruction is the force and immediacy of the
corrective action. 10 ' Great deference is given to the trial judge's ability to determine and implement appropriate measures to remove
possible prejudice. 03 If the defendant does not object to the curative
approach adopted by the trial judge, the defendant will be deemed

to have acquiesced.104 The Law Court has articulated suspicion
about jurors' ability to disregard improper argument when so instructed. 0 5 This fiction is central to our adversary system, however,
and the court has adhered to it despite its suspicion. 10 0 In cases
where the trial judge has given prompt and complete curative in98. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (citing State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467
(Me. 1981)).
99. See State v. Ingalls, 544 A.2d 1272, 1276 (Me. 1988) ("In applying the harmless error rule to an improper prosecutorial comment . . .our judgment must be
based on our own reading of the, record and on what seems to us to have been the
impact of the [improper prosecutorial comment] on the minds of an average jury.")
(quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)).
100. State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231, 238 (Me. 1984) (citing State v. Gordon, 321
A.2d 352, 364 (Me. 1974)).
101. See, e.g., State v. Burgoyne, 452 A.2d 393, 396 (Me. 1982) (judge admonished
prosecutor and instructed jury); State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 511 (Me. 1981) (after
defense objection judge cautioned prosecutor and instructed jury to disregard
characterization).
102. See State v. Reilly, 446 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Me. 1982) (instruction that was
neither prompt nor specific inadequate to alleviate prejudice).
103. See, e.g., State v. Beathem, 482 A.2d 860, 863 (Me. 1984); State v. Brown,
410 A.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Me. 1980).
104. See, e.g., State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 509, 511 (Me. 1981); State v. Brown, 410
A.2d 1033, 1037 (Me. 1980).
105. See State v. Gordon, 321 A.2d 352, 363-64 (Me. 1974).
106. State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1324 (Me. 1981) ("In order for the jury system to function, it must be assumed that, absent unusual circumstances, a jury will
follow a court's instructions where the instructions are clear and the circumstances
are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to follow them.").
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structions, the Law Court has found it sufficient only to criticize the

prosecutorial tactics without vacating the defendant's conviction.107
The Law Court has also relied upon the harmless error doctrine to
uphold convictions in the presence of prosecutorial misconduct
when there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt;103
the instances of misconduct were isolated;100 the defense addressed
the prosecutor's improper comment; 110 or, the prosecutor's argument
was in reply to defense argument or was in keeping with the tenor of
the entire trial.""
Many commentators have identified the harmless error as one of
the foremost causes of the perpetuation of prosecutorial forensic
misconduct. 11 2 As Senior Circuit Judge Aldrige pointed out after invoking the harmless error rule to uphold a conviction in the face of
107. See, e.g., State v. Osgood, 505 A.2d 478, 480 (Me. 1986) (presiding justice's
charge eliminated any adverse inference created by prosecutor's misstatement); State
v. Beathem, 482 A.2d 860, 863-64 (Me. 1984) (general curative instruction sufficient to
cure misleading argument); State v. Burgoyne, 452 A.2d 393, 396 (Me. 1982) (admonishment of prosecutor and instruction cured prosecutor's inflammatory closing argument); State v. Haberski, 449 A.2d 373, 379 (Me. 1982) (trial judge's prompt and
complete curative instruction sufficient to cure improper conduct), cert. denied sub
nom. Haberski v. Maine, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1302
(Me. 1981) ("Only where there are exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or
prosecutorial bad faith will a curative instruction be deemed inadequate to eliminate
the prejudice."); State v. Gordon, 321 A.2d 352, 364 (Me. 1974) (general curative instruction that prosecutor's statement is not evidence can salvage the fundamental
fairness of the trial); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 184 A.2d 225, 234 (1962) (proper
instruction cured prosecutorial error); State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 68 A. 454, 455
(1907) (proper instruction removes "any unjust influence being left upon the minds of
the jury from anything said by the attorney for the state"), errordismissed sub noma.
Martel v. Maine, 218 U.S. 666 (1910).
108. State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d 130 (Me. 1985); State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582 (Me.
1976).
109. State v. Burgoyne, 452 A.2d 393, 396 (Me. 1982); State v. Conner, 434 A.2d
509, 511-12 (Me. 1981).
110. State v. Boyle, 560 A.2d 556, 557 (Me. 1989) (prosecutor's inaccuracies were
properly addressed by defense counsel); State v. Doughty, 554 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me.
1989) (any prejudice from prosecutor's remarks was remedied by defense counsel's
careful explanation).
111. State v. Conner, 434 A.2d at 511-12 (argument which appealed to jury sympathy and highlighted callousness of shooting not improper where defense had
claimed shooting was accidental); State v. Kimball, 424 A.2d 684, 691 (Mle. 1981) (use
of defense counsel's name in closing argument improper, but harmless since prosecutor's argument was a fair reply to defense's argument). Cf. State v. Niemszyk, 551
A.2d 842, 844 (Me. 1988) (stating that prosecutor's remark that police had done a
good job not obvious error where remark was responsive to defense argument that
denigrated police investigation).
112. See Vilna Bilaisis, Harmless Error:Abettor of Court Room Misconduct, 74 J
CmRm
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457 (1983). See also, Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand TrialJudges, 50 Ttx. L Rnv. 629 (1972) (harmless error
is a procedural snare that deprives appellate review of its potential force); Bennett L.
Gershman, Why ProsecutorsMisbehave, 22 Cai. L BuLL. 131 (1986) (harmless error
is the most significant reason why prosecutors continue to misbehave).
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prosecutorial misconduct:
Although we do not reverse, we cannot avoid repeating that resorting to the harmless error rule has unhappy consequences. If every
time the cat complains because junior has pulled its tail father
says, "Don't do that again," but does nothing further because the
cat appears unharmed, Dr. Spock and others would say that this is
no good, for either junior or the cat.113
The Law Court has also recognized that there is a danger that its
application of the harmless error rule might provide prosecutors
with a false sense of security. Thus, the Law Court, when it has applied the harmless error rule, has repeatedly stated that its refusal
to vacate the trial court's judgment should not be construed as a
11
ratification of the prosecutor's remarks.
V. Steen, Casella, and Tripp: Redefining Personal Opinion
Collectively, the decisions surveyed in Parts III and IV of this
Comment demonstrate that the Law Court has attempted to strike a
balance between the prosecutor's duty as advocate and the duty to
preserve the fundamental fairness of the trial. These decisions acknowledge that not every characterization of evidence made by a
prosecutor in the course of advocacy is interpreted by the jury as a
personal opinion. The meaning attributable to the prosecutor's closing argument can only be determined by evaluating the context in
which these remarks are made.
In Steen, Casella, and Tripp the court faced situations in which
reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence that the defendant had not told the truth. The Law Court, however, examined
portions of the prosecutor's remarks in isolation instead of in the
framework of the evidence presented at trial, and failed to recognize
the distinction between "personal opinion" and proper argument
based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. By misapplying
the "personal opinion" limitation and playing fast and loose with
the applicable standard of review, the Law Court in these three
cases unduly restricted prosecutorial summation.
A.

State v. Steen: Improper Suggestions

In State v. Steen,11 5 the defendant faced two counts of gross sex113. United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 1985).
114. See, e.g., State v. Dube, 522 A.2d 904, 911 (Me. 1987) ("No one should take
our present affirmance as an endorsement of all aspects of the District Attorney's
conduct. . . ."); State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d 130, 137 (Me. 1985) (court "strongly disapprove[d]" of prosecutor's conduct but found vacation of conviction inappropriate
sanction); State v. Libby, 410 A.2d 562, 568 (Me. 1980) ("Our unwillingness to reverse
the conviction should not be taken as approval of a prosecutorial comment such as
that in issue here.") (McKusick, C.J., dissenting).
115. 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993).
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ual assault116 arising from an incident in the early morning hours of
April 12, 1991. Both parties agreed that they had met at a fraternity
party where they had danced and talked. Beyond this point, their
stories diverged. Both the victim and the defendant took the stand
to tell vastly differing accounts of what had happened that evening,
and the trial became largely a contest of credibility.
The state's case consisted of the testimony of the victim, others in
attendance at the party, and medical experts. The state's witnesses
testified that the victim had repeatedly spurned the defendant's advances, that the defendant had forced his way into a bathroom the
victim was using, and had sexually assaulted her, causing injuries
consistent with forcible rape. 11 7 Additionally, the prosecutor introduced inculpatory statements made by the defendant in the hours
immediately following his arrest.11 8 The defendant, in contrast, testified that "every time he glanced at [the victim], she was . . . already looking at him," that she had danced "seductively" to entice
him, and had engaged in consensual sex in the bathroom. 110 The defendant's expert witness attributed the victim's bruises to a drunken
fall down a flight of steps1 20 and testified that the injuries 12to
the
1
victim's genitalia were not inconsistent with consensual sex.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the prosecutor's tactics
during cross examination of the defendant and in closing argument
had denied him a fair trial. 122 The defendant pointed out that, over
his objection, the court allowed the prosecutor to ask the defendant
twenty-four questions requiring him to give his opinion as to the
veracity of other witnesses.1 23 Also, over a defense objection, the
prosecutor asked the defendant argumentative questions concerning
116. The statute provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of gross sexual
assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and that person
submits as a result of compulsion." Ma. Rlv. STAT. ANN.tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(A) (West

Supp. 1993-1994).
117. Brief of Appellee at 2-8, State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993) (No. CUM92-170).
118. Id. at 13.
119. Brief of Appellant at 10-15, State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me. 1993) (No.
CUM-92-170).
120. Id. at 23.
121. Id. at 21-23.
122. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 148.
123. Id. at n.2.

For example, the prosecutor asked the following questions
Q. I want you to tell me which statements you say really happened and
which statements you're saying Detective Drown is lying about.
Q. So Detective Drown is making this up?
Q. She [the complainant] is lying about this?
Q. Well, you are saying that everything she said to this jury is a lie?
Q. And everyone else who testified in this court room all week long was
lying?
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the inconsistencies in his own statements, such as "[s]o you made
this one up own your own?' 1

24

Finally, in closing argument, the

prosecutor attacked the credibility of the defense expert by stating:
Now at trial [Steen] has got a theory for how [the vaginal tear suffered by the complainant] occurred. And what does he do to advance this theory? He calls Dr. Piver, a medical doctor, no less,
flown up specially all the way from Maryland just to testify for Jon
Steen. And Dr. Piver sits on this witness stand and he says that
that tear, well, that tear wasn't big enough for rape, that tear must
have been consensual .... I suggest to you, ladies and gentleman,
that his opinion is based5 on $2,500, the money the defendant paid
12
him for his testimony.

The Law Court first examined the propriety of the prosecutor's
cross-examination of the defendant. The prosecutor's questions, the
court found, impermissibly attempted to push the defendant into
saying other witnesses had lied, and thus invaded the jury's special
province to determine who was telling the truth.2 0' The Law Court
then considered whether the prosecutor's statements in her crossexamination of Steen and in closing argument had improperly suggested to the jury her personal belief that Steen and his expert witness were lying. In the space of three sentences the court found,
without any analysis or explanation, that the prosecutor had
"clearly" suggested to the jury that these witnesses were lying:
Although it is proper for the State to point out inconsistencies in
a defendant's statement, it is impermissible for a prosecutor to assert that the defendant lied on the stand. The prosecutor through
her cross-examination of Steen and her statements in closing remarks clearly suggested to the jury that she thought these witnesses were lying.
Since we cannot find it highly probable that the jury's determination of Steen's guilt was unaffected by the prosecutor's comments, we vacate his conviction. 2 "
Examination of the Law Court's analysis in this case reveals that
its holding with respect to prosecutorial expression of personal opinion is a marked departure from existing Maine case law. In previous
cases, the Law Court has found expressions of the prosecutor's personal convictions objectionable in two situations: when prosecutors
introduce their own credibility into the jury's determination of guilt
or innocence, or when they imply that their personal opinions are
based on evidence unknown to the members of the jury.128 Viewed
in the context of the entire proceeding, neither the prosecutor's
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 149 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See supra discussion accompanying notes 42-57.
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questions nor her suggestion in closing argument qualify as expressions of personal opinion. In Steen, the prosecutor's statements did
not inject her own credibility into the jury's determination nor did
her statements imply that they were based on information not
presented to the jury. The court, however, having identified what it
believed to be an improper expression of personal opinion, summarily condemned the prosecutor's conduct without attempting to analyze the reasonableness of the prosecutor's remarks in light of the
possible inferences that could be raised from the evidence presented
at trial. By labeling the prosecutor's statements as "personal opinion," the court broadened the definition of "personal opinion" to include argumentative questions and ill-advised prefatory language.
Looking first at the questions the prosecutor asked Steen on
cross-examination, what the Law Court found improper about these
inquiries was the prosecutor's suggestion that Steen had "made this
one up" and was having trouble "keep[ing] this all straight," which,
it found, implied to the jury that Steen was lying. 120 In light of the
evidence presented to the jury, these questions, while objectionable
for their argumentative nature, were otherwise a proper assault on
30

Steen's defense.2

At trial the jury was presented with no less than four versions of
what Steen had said transpired: three progressively less inculpatory
statements made after his arrest and his even less incriminating testimony on direct.113 The Maine Rules of Evidence only prohibit eliciting an opinion concerning an ultimate issue when the answer
would not be helpful to the trier of fact. 132 The Law Court's holding
129. The only indication that this is what the Law Court found objectionable is
that in the published opinion the Law Court added emphasis to these portions of the
prosecutor's excerpted remarks. See State v. Steen, 623 A.2d at 148-49.
130. See State v. Johnson, 472 A.2d 1367, 1373 (Me. 1984) (prosecutor's comment
indicating that there were three versions of the events before the jury, that they all
could not be true, and that only one version was true and the other two were patently
false was not error and did nothing more than review the absurdities or discrepancies
in the defendant's testimony, which cast an adverse light on his credibility) (citing
State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 17 (Me. 1983)).
131. At trial the jury was presented with testimony by the investigating officer
that the defendant had related to him three versions of the alleged assault. When the
investigator initially confronted the defendant, the defendant stated that he was
sorry for the whole incident and that it was his fault. Further, he told the police that
the victim had resisted. Brief of Appellee at 11, State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146 (Me.
1993) (No. CUM-92-170). At the police station the defendant for the first time
claimed that the victim's bruises had resulted from a fall down the steps at the fraternity house, but he still admitted that the victim had resisted. rd. at 12. In a written statement rendered at the police station, the defendant asserted that the victim
had also fallen in the bathroom and that after initial resistance had been a willing
participant in the sexual act. Id. at 13. Finally, at trial on direct the defendant had
characterized the events in the bathroom as consensual. Brief of Appellant at 14,
Steen (No. CUM-92-170).
132. Mx1R Evm. 701 states in part:
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is sound if what the prosecutor was trying to do was elicit a conclusion from the witness that would not help the jury.13 3 Here, the
prosecutor's inquiries were not an attempt to elicit the defendant's
opinion on an ultimate issue; they were an attempt to impeach the
defendant through the use of his prior inconsistent statements. The
Rules of Evidence permit the prosecutor to impeach a witness's
credibility through the use of that witness's prior inconsistent statements.23 4 Asking Steen about these inconsistencies drew the jury's
attention to his apparently perjurious testimony. ' 5 While these
questions were perhaps inartful, they were not inappropriate.
Steen's defense rested substantially on pitting his credibility
against that of the victim. These questions drew the jury's attention
to the variances in Steen's testimony and highlighted the implausibility of his story. While the Law Court rightly criticized the prosecutor's cross-examination tactics, the fact that the prosecutor asked
pointed and forceful questions indicating her disbelief of the defendant's version of the incident could not have denied the defendant a fair trial.
The Law Court's citation to State v. Smith'36 for the proposition
that "it is impermissible for a prosecutor to assert that the defendant lied on the stand" is an incomplete and incorrect statement of
the law in Maine.137 Such a statement is only impermissible when it
is not supported by the evidence. 3 8 In Steen, the evidence indicated
substantial inconsistencies between the defendant's testimony and
his previous statements. When the evidence supports such an inferIf the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
See also ME. R. EVD. 704:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.
133. See FIELD & MURRAY, MAIN EVIDENCE, § 704.1 at 281 (2d ed. 1987) ("Both
Rules 701 and 702 embody a criterion of helpfulness for lay and expert witnesses
alike. An opinion that amounts to no more than choosing up sides is plainly
unhelpful.").
134. See ME. R. EVD. 607: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him."
135. At Steen's sentencing, the trial judge, Superior Court Justice William S.
Broderick, in meting out a five year sentence to the defendant, said of Steen's testimony that, "In [his] twelve years of watching this type of trial that was the most
obvious perjury [he had] ever seen." Tess Nacelewicz, Man Gets Five-Year Term for
Rape, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 18, 1992, at BI.
136. 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983).
137. State v. Steen, 623 A.2d 146, 149 (Me. 1993).
138. See State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5 (Me. 1989) (prosecutor's comment must be
fairly based on facts in evidence).
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ence, the prosecutor must be free to cross-examine and argue that
the defendant is not believable.' 9 Any other holding gives the testifying defendant the functional equivalent of an irrebuttable presumption of truthfulness.
The court also found impermissible the prosecutor's use of the
term "I suggest" to introduce an inference that the jury might draw
from the evidence that the defense expert had received $2,500 for
his appearance at trial. While "I suggest" is one of the prosecutorial
"dirty verbs," which like the phrases "I think" and "I believe" are
better left unsaid, 14 0 in this case its use was at worst impolitic. This
isolated use of "I suggest" to introduce an otherwise legitimate inference concerning a defense witness's bias, drawn from the prosecutor's analysis of the evidence, was inadequate to cause the jury to
believe that they should accept the assertion because it represented
the prosecutor's personal conviction. Certainly, it would have been
proper for the prosecutor to say, "Ladies and Gentleman, when you
consider Dr. Piver's testimony, consider whether his opinion is
based on $2,500, the money the defendant paid him for his testimony." The unfortunate addition of "I suggest," did not impermissibly inject the prosecutor's personal opinion into this part of the closing. Moreover, even if the remark were considered "personal
opinion," very little prejudice could have resulted since the prosecutor's suggestion was not based on information unavailable to the
jury, but was based on the doctor's own testimony. 1 The argument's language indicates that the prosecutor was merely calling for
the jury to include the amount the witness was paid in their assessment of the witness' credibility, rather than attempting to sway the
jury's analysis by introducing her personal belief into the summation. As the Law Court pointed out in State v. Walsh,' 42 "[j]urors
. ..are aware that the role of the prosecutor is to argue for guilt,
and might just as well read nothing more into "I believe .... '"4
By not examining the prosecutor's remarks within the framework
of the entire trial, the Law Court failed to identify circumstances
that rendered the prosecutor's actions harmless error.' There was
overwhelming evidence of Steen's guilt, including his own admission.
In addition, the prosecutor's argument and questions were a fair reply to a defense strategy that placed the defendant's credibility in
competition with the victims. Finally, any expression of personal
139. State v. Johnson, 472 A.2d 1367 (Me. 1984) (remarks that draw the jury's
attention to differing version of evidence are permissible).
140. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
141. See State v. Smith, 456 A.2d 16, 19 (Me. 1983) (favorable to State on question of prejudice that improper opinion of prosecutor was based only on facts in evidence and not secret information).
142. 558 A.2d 1184 (Me. 1989).
143. Id. at 1187.
144. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
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opinion in closing argument was isolated and transitory. By failing
to identify the prosecutor's missteps as harmless, the Law Court, in
meting out punishment to the prosecutor, placed additional restrictions on the prosecutor's closing argument.
B. State v. Casella: "Liar"--Inferenceor Epithet?
In State v. Casella,4" the Law Court faced the issue of whether a
prosecutor's summation alone had prevented the defendant from

having a fair trial. In Casella, the prosecutor's closing was problematic, but instead of identifying and discussing the actual errors, the

Law Court, anxious to punish the prosecutor, mechanically applied
the "personal opinion" label to a variety of mistakes and further
broadened its definition of "personal opinion."
Casella appealed his conviction on four counts of theft by unau-

thorized taking146 and one count of witness tampering. 147 Through

his corporation, Case Equipment, Casella marketed the subli-color
machine14 in national magazines such as Entrepreneur.14' Customers who called the advertised toll free number received literature ex-

tolling the machine and a phone call from Casella, or one of his
salesmen, urging the customer to come to Maine for a demonstra-

tion. 50 In three of the incidents for which Casella was standing trial,
Casella persuaded interested but still uncertain buyers to give him a
check for the value of the machine, between $10,000 and $13,000, so
that they could receive follow-up training during their initial visit
instead of having to make a separate trip to Maine for the training
145.
146.

632 A.2d 121 (Me.), withdrawn, 629 A.2d 608 (Me. 1993).
ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 353(1) (West 1983).
147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 454(1)(A)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
148. The subli-color machine allegedly transposed images onto t-shirts and mugs,
State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 121. These theft counts, however, were not the only time
Anthony Casella's business had run afoul of the law. Casella moved his printing business to Maine in 1984, after the Massachusetts Attorney General began an investigation into his trade practices. PrintingFirm Targeted by FTC, PORTLAND PREss HERALD, July 20, 1989, at 40. Moreover, in July of 1989, the Federal Trade Commission
brought suit in United States District Court against Anthony Casella's company, Case
Equipment, alleging that Case had bilked customers nationwide out of thirty eight
million dollars by selling the same Subli-color System that was at issue in the state
prosecution. The FTC described the subli-color machine as "nothing more than an
outdated mimeograph machine that tended to shake violently and jam." Printing
Equipment Dealer Faces Court Today, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 21, 1989, at
24. In August of 1991 Casella reached a settlement with the FTC, promising to pay
$250,000 to the Federal Government and to stop selling printing equipment for ten
years. PrintingMachine Salesman Guilty of Theft, PORTLAND PRESs HERALD, Sept.
19, 1991, at 5D.
149. Brief of Appellant at 4, State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121 (Me.), withdrawn, 629
A.2d 608 (Me. 1993) (No. CUM-92-426).
150. Brief of Appellee at 4, 21, 31, State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121 (Me.), withdrawn, 629 A.2d 608 (Me. 1993) (No. CUM-92-426).
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after purchase. 151 Casella promised each customer that he would return the check if they decided not to buy, and that he would cash

the check only if they told him they wanted the machine. "5 2 In each
instance, Casella cashed the check and shipped the equipment with-

out regard for whether the customer had actually consented to the
purchase. 15 ' The fourth theft count resulted from Casella's convinc-

ing a customer, who had told him she was not interested in the
subli-color, that his company could deliver the machine she was in-

terested in for substantially less money.' " Based on Casella's statements, this customer sent Casella $10,000 and received in return a
subli-color machine.' 55
At trial, the defendant characterized the four disputed transactions as business quarrels that belonged in civil court.15 The prosecutor attempted to use discrepancies between the testimony of his
witnesses and that of the defendant to demonstrate that Casella
deceived his customers in order to take advantage of them. "5 7 The
parties' strategies made the major issue at trial the credibility of the
prosecution and defense witnesses. In closing argument, the prosecutor, advancing his central theme that Casella used deceptive tactics

to steal from his customers, referred to the defendant as a "liar" and
to the defendant's statements, both in-court and out-of-court, as

"lies." 158 Defense counsel did not object to this characterization, but

151. Id. at 6, 22, 32.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 8, 24, 33. One customer did agree to buy the subli-color machine, but
upon receipt found the machine was used and inoperable. Id. at 32-33.
154. Id. at 15-19.
155. Id.
156. See State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 124 (Rudman, J., dissenting). See also Brief
of Appellant at 2-3.
157. Brief of Appellee at 39.
158. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 121-22. The majority opinion points out that the
prosecutor asserted his opinion, not less than 41 times, that Casella had lied. Here, in
fuller context, are some of those instances:
Now, as the trial in this case progressed and as the evidence came in, it
became apparent that the theory of the defense is really the basic principal
upon which Anthony Casella operated his business. It's this basic attitude
toward these four victims that you've heard from and it's this. Anthony
Casella will say anything. He will do anything. He will tell any lie to get
your money. And once he's got it, once he's managed to separate you from
your money, he ships the equipment whether you want it or not...
Brief of Appellee, App. at 9-10.
In his way of thinking and acting in his world of lies and deception he's
created the perfect crime. Once you've been hooked by him, once he's got
your money, you're in a maze of deception you'll never get out of and you
can never find your money.
What Anthony Casella didn't count on ladies and gentlemen, was (the
victims] who said "we are not going to let you get away with this. We're not
giving up. We're not going away. How dare you steal from us and just ignore me."
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moved for a mistrial immediately following the prosecutor's completion of his argument. 159 The trial judge denied the defense's motion
for a mistrial and upon conviction the defendant appealed.1 e0
In a four-to-three decision the Law Court held that the prosecutor
had been overzealous in his summation to the jury.161 The court reasoned that, since the trial was largely a credibility contest, the prosecutor's repeated references to the defendant as a "liar" had denied
the defendant a fair trial. 162 The court held that it was clearly erroneous for the trial judge to deny the defendant's motion for mistrial.1 6 3 Citing its recent decision in State v.Steen, the Law Court
stated that it had repeatedly held that it was "improper for a prosecutor to express an opinion on the credibility of a defendant."' "' In
this case, because the defendant had not admitted to lying, the court
... But most of all, ladies and gentlemen, he didn't count on you. According to his theory of how things were supposed to work, this trial was
not supposed to happen .... You were never suppose [sic] to learn what
really happened .... You were never supposed to see the evidence. You
were never suppose [sic] to hear him explain his lies.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 11-12.
What do you look at to assess a person's state of mind? Well, you look at
the very things you look at in every day life. And you use your common
sense. You look at what a person says and what a person does. If a person is
lying, that is telling you about his intent. That tells you about his lack of
good faith. If a person is lying, he wants to hide something. And if he wants
to hide something, he doesn't want you to know the truth and if he doesn't
want you to know the truth, he doesn't want you to know what he's really
thinking about. And that's how to tell that Anthony Casella meant to steal
because remember what I said he'll say anything. He'll do anything. He will
tell any lie that has to be told to get and keep the money. And that includes
lying to his attorneys and lying to you on that witness stand.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 15.
And he had one big problem and the name of that problem was Al Daniel.
You saw and heard that man testify last Friday. I leave it to you to assess
that man's credibility and believability. I won't belabor the contradictions,
the inconsistencies, the lack of recall and recollection. At one point he said
it was just an oversight it wasn't signed and then it all became Michael
McMurray's fault. At one point he said he had mailed the check but then
he testified on the stand Michael McMurray said, "don't take the check."
All his fault. Anthony Casella was hoping he could explain himself out of
Osterland's problem by blaming it on the inexperience of Al Daniel. The
problem is that birds of a feather flock together. Anthony Casella and Al
Daniel couldn't keep their lies straight.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 37. Considering the prosecutor's theory of the case, that
Casella had perpetrated these thefts by deception, it seems inevitable that the prosecutor would refer to the statements Casella had made to his customers as lies. If
Casella wasn't lying, there was no crime.
159. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 122.

160. Id.
161. Id.

162. Id. at 124.
163. Id. at 123-24.
164. Id. at 122-23.
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held that the prosecutor's inference was an improper expression of
opinion concerning the veracity of the witness which interjected the
prosecutor's credibility into the jury's analysis of guilt or
6 5

innocence.1

The dissent, by analyzing the prosecutor's closing more thoroughly, concluded that, "when read (1) in its entirety, [and] (2) in
165. Id. at 123. On November 9, 1993 the Supreme Judicial Court ordered the
decision in State v. Casella published at 629 A.2d 608 (Me. 1993) withdravm and
replaced. The majority opinion had been modified in two places. The original opinion
at 610 stated:
On appeal, the State acknowledges that "the prosecutor attacked
Casella's credibility by suggesting that Casella lied to the jury while on the
witness stand" but argues that his "characterization of the defendant's testimony as 'lies'. .. was not an expression of personal opinion." We disagree. Absent an admission by the defendant that he had lied to the jury,
the prosecutor's characterization of defendant's testimony can represent
nothing other than his opinion. The prosecutor may well believe in the correctness of his opinion and his belief may even be well founded but it is an
opinion nonetheless.
In the modified decision this passage was replaced with the
following.
On appeal, the State acknowledges that "the prosecutor attacked Casella's
credibility by suggesting that Casella lied to the jury while on the witness
stand" but argues that his "characterization of the defendant's testimony as
'lies' . . . was not an expression of personal opinion." We disagree. The

prosecutor may well believe in the correctness of his opinion, and his belief
may be well founded but it is an opinion nonetheless.
State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 122. The original opinion at 611 statedHere, Casella objects to the prosecutor's assertion that he had lied to the
jury. Casella had not admitted lying to the jury, and thus the prosecutor's
comments were not fairly based on the evidence. Absent an admission by
Casella, it was for the jury, not the prosecutor, to determine which witnesses were telling the truth.
In the reissued decision this passage was replaced with the following.
Here, Casella made no such admission. It was for the jury, not the prosecutor, to determine which witnesses were telling the truth.
State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 123.
By removing the language concerning the prosecutor's comment not being "fairly
based on the evidence" and the "absent an admission" language, the court forecloses
a future prosecutor who comments on the credibility of the defendant from arguing
that the attack was proper because the defendant had admitted his deceit. While the
Law Court states that this case is distinguishable from State v. Pendexter, 495 A.2d
1241 (Me. 1985), where the defendant admitted lying, the language of the Casella
opinion narrows Pendexter, allowing the prosecutor to raise the inference that the
defendant has lied only in those rare cases where the defendant admits to lying on
the stand. This is a departure from Law Court's previous decisions. In the wake of
Casella, even where the prosecutor's belief that the defendant has lied is "well
founded" on the evidence, it seems that the Law Court would find that the prosecutor is barred from arguing this inference to the jury. Thus, the natural and probable
consequences of this rewrite, in particular, and the Casella decision as a whole is that,
even in cases where the defendant has admitted to lying, the Law Court will be highly
suspect of any comment made by the prosecutor concerning the credibility of a
witness.
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the context of the nature of the charges against Casella," the prosecutor's summation was fairly based on the evidence introduced at
trial. 6 The dissent portrayed the prosecutor's description of the defendant as nothing more than an artful closing argument performed
with allowable vigor and zeal that was well within the bounds of
fairness prescribed by the court.6 7 The dissenting justices added
that even if they conceded that the prosecutor's summation was improper, they would sustain Casella's conviction based on the "overwhelming evidence of guilt" and the curative instructions offered by
the trial judge.' 68
In Casella, as in Steen, the Law Court failed to recognize the distinction between a prosecutor improperly expressing a personal
opinion, and properly suggesting to the jury a fair and reasonable
inference drawn from the evidence. The majority ends its inquiry as
soon as it identifies the impermissible "personal opinion." By ending
its analysis at this point the court failed to place the comments in
the context of the trial to determine whether the offending comments could possibly be a reasonable inference based upon the evidence presented. While it is impermissible for the prosecutor to
state that the defendant has lied on the stand when the evidence
does not support the inference, not every prosecutorial statement
concerning the defendant's credibility is an impermissible expression of "personal opinion."' 69 A proper analysis of the prosecutor's
comments in this case demonstrates that the Law Court was only
partially correct. The prosecutor's argument in this case was improper, not because it represented an expression of his personal convictions, but because portions of the argument were designed to inflame the jury and produce a conviction based on something other
than an unprejudiced analysis of the evidence.
The prosecutor's comments that the defendant had lied were a
proper attack on the plausibility of the defendant's alibi. During his
trial, Casella took the stand and presented an alibi that asserted
that the substance of the charges against him were little more than
business disputes that his disgruntled customers had blown out of
proportion. 7 0 His testimony contradicted the corroborated testimony of the prosecutor's witnesses and was also inconsistent with
statements he had made to investigators.' 7 ' Moreover, a proper interpretation of Maine Bar Rule 3.7(e)(2)(v) limits only those expressions of the prosecutor's opinion that indicate the opinion is not
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125.
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156.
Brief of Appellee at 45-50.
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based on matters in evidence.' 7- The Law Court has held that the
7

prosecutor may comment on the adequacy of defense evidence,'2
and may argue for any position with respect to the credibility of a
witness, so long as these arguments are based on an analysis of the
evidence. 7 4 Within the parameters of permissible argument must be
included the latitude to raise an inference based on discrepancies in
the defendant's testimony that the defendant was not credible,
when such an inference is warranted by the evidence.
In Casella, by suggesting that the defendant lied, just like he had
lied to the victims while committing his crimes, the prosecutor was
merely using popular and understandable terms to ask the jury to
assess the plausibility of the defendant's alibi in light of the evidence. Rather than expressing a personal belief, the prosecutor was
attempting to persuade the jury to draw the inference that he had
suggested. The prosecutor repeatedly told the jury that they were
the ultimate judges of "credibility and believability." 17" It comes as
no surprise to the jury that the prosecutor believes in the strength of
the case and the guilt of the accused.176 In this context, prosecutorial
172. See supra note 43.
173. See supra note 41.
174. State v. Vigue, 420 A.2d 242, 246-47 (Me. 1981). See also supra notes 38-39,
55-57 and accompanying text.
175. The prosecutor prefaced each of his discussions of the substantive counts by
reminding the jury that they were the ultimate arbiters of credibility:
Count 1 involves Cindy Khoury. The young woman from Texas. You saw
her. You heard her testimony. You determine. It's up to you. You determine whether you find her credible and believable. You decide whether her
testimony was consistent with the evidence. It's your province.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 16.
Count 2 involves Helen Piantedosi, the woman from New Hampshire. And
you saw her. You heard her testimony. You determine, it's all up to you,
you determine whether you found her credible and believable. You decided
whether her testimony was consistent with the evidence.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 23.
Count 3 involved Joanne Osterland of Connecticut. You saw her. You heard
the testimony. You judge whether you find her credible and believable. It's
up to you. You decide whether her testimony is consistent with evidence.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 31.
Count 4 involved Teresa Monroe from California. You saw her. You heard
her testimony. You judge whether you find her believable and credible. You
decide whether her testimony is consistent with the evidence.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 39.
That brings us to Anthony Casella. You had the opportunity to watch him.
You had the opportunity to hear his testimony. You judge his credibility.
You judge his believability. You determine whether his testimony is consistent with the evidence. You compare his testimony to that of Cindy
Khoury, Helen Piantedosi, Joanne Osterland and Teresa Monroe and other
witnesses who testified in this case.
Brief of Appellee, App. at 45.
176. State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Me. 1989). The entire criminal adjudicative process reinforces the prosecutor's belief in the defendant's guilt. See generally
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comments that the defendant had lied to the jury did nothing more
than suggest an inference based on the evidence, a proper subject
for comment by the prosecutor, which the jury understood, from
both the prosecutor's closing
and the instructions, that they were
177
free to accept or reject.

The majority's cursory condemnation of the use of the term "lie"
illustrates that this term is especially problematic for prosecutors.
For instance, in State v. Smith,'7 8 the prosecutor characterized "apparently conflict[ing]"

statements of the defendant as "lies.

1 79

While Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines a "lie" as an untrue or inaccurate statement that the speaker may or may not believe to be true, 80 the Law Court in Smith found that the prosecutor had impermissibly expressed his personal opinion. 81 The court
has never fully explained why the prosecutor's use of "lie" or "liar"
represents a "personal opinion." Senior Circuit Judge Coffin, writing
for the First Circuit Court of Appeals, has offered one explanation of
why the court abhors prosecutorial use of conclusory terms such as
"lie." The prosecutor, Coffin suggests, by directly accusing the defendant of lying, approaches the precipice of prosecutorial misconduct because such comments may lead the jury to believe that the
prosecutor's statement is a "personal opinion" based on information
not in evidence.

182

The Law Court's perfunctory designation of the prosecutor's closing argument in Casella as "personal opinion" failed to recognize
more fundamental errors in the summation and squandered the opportunity to educate the state's prosecutors. The Law Court has
previously stated that the use of "liar" may be objectionable for
other, simpler reasons than that it is an expression of personal opinRandolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CrM.L. BUL. 550

(1987). Seeing defendants plead guilty in weak cases and being found guilty by juries,
the prosecutor comes to believe that not only the convicted but even the accused are
guilty. Additionally, having served as investigator, judge, and jury, in the protracted
pretrial phases of each defendant's case, when the prosecutor enters the courtroom
she is convinced of the defendant's guilt and inevitably endeavors to gain a conviction. Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Why ProsecutorsAct Like Prosecutors,11 REC. OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 302, 312-13 (1956) (when prosecutors decide to prosecute it is only after
they have satisfied themselves of the defendant's guilt); Carol A. Corrigan, On
ProsecutorialEthics, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 537, 542 (1986) (no prosecutor should
charge or handle a case at any stage of its progress through the system unless he is
personally satisfied that the defendant is guilty).
177. See, e.g., State v. Harnish, 560 A.2d 5, 10 (Me. 1989) ("When the prosecutor
argued that Harnish had not told the truth ...he was really doing nothing more
than stating the principal factual issue before the jury. In context, the prosecutor was
not asking the jury to accept his judgment on [the defendant's] credibility.").
178. 456 A.2d 16 (Me. 1983).
179. Id. at 17.
180.
181.
182.

WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 656 (1979).
State v. Smith, 456 A.2d at 17.
See United States v. Garcia, 818 F.2d 136, 143-44 (1st Cir. 1987).
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ion.' 8a "Liar" is a pejorative term. 18' While the prosecutor may not
have been expressing his personal opinion, by repeatedly using the

term he disparaged the defendant and cultivated feelings of opprobrium and scorn about the defendant among the jurors. The Law

Court has held that such appeals to the jury are impermissible.'

5

Additionally, the Law Court noted that the prosecutor concluded by

telling the jury that "they should not 'let Casella walk out of this
courtroom thinking he could con you,' that they should 'do their

duty and convict him,' and avoid becoming 'his next victim."' 0
The court condemned these comments because it found that they
"went directly to credibility.' ' 87 While the comments were improper, it was not because they were comments on the credibility of
the witness. The comments addressed the consequences of an ac-

quittal and introduced issues broader than guilt or innocence for the
jury to consider.,18 The prosecutor's remark also misrepresented the

duty of the jury: the jury's duty is not to convict, but to engage in a
dispassionate analysis of the evidence and arrive at a determination

of the accused's guilt or innocence. 8 " These comments improperly
attempted to appeal to the jury's emotions and prejudice, thereby
183. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
184. One might contend that "liar" is merely invective, not disparaging, and
therefore permissible. See State v. Martel, 103 Me. 63, 68 A. 454 (1907), error dismissed sub nom. Martel v. Maine, 218 U.S. 666 (1910). Thus an isolated use of "liar"
may withstand judicial scrutiny while repeated use may be condemned because the
court views persistent use of pejoratives as indicative of the prosecutor's bad faith.
See infra note 198 at 270-71. This line between what is merely insulting and permissible and what is unduly inflammatory is difficult to demarcate. The line between
proper and improper behavior "can only be located through a sense of fitness and
taste and an appreciation of the prosecutor's proper role. Those who cannot discern
that line with confidence had best stay a safe distance away from it." United States v.
Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 175-76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976) (citations
omitted).
185. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
186. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d 121, 123-24 (Me.), withdrawn, 629 A.2d 608 (Me.
1993).
187. Id. at 124.
188. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. See also United States v.
Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 845 (1st Cir. 1983) (prosecutor's closing argument, which
stated that a finding of not guilty would "aid and abet" the defendant and that it
would be the "final irony" if the defendant "having orchestrated lies ... were finally
able to sell" his story to the jury, was improper because the argument was designed to
inflame the jury).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (urging jury to do its job
has no place in criminal justice). See also, United States v. Mandelbaum, 803 F.2d 42,
44 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[The] prosecutor had erred in urging a jury to 'do its job' and
convict. . . .Cases are to be decided by a dispassionate review of the evidence admitted in court. There should be no suggestion that a jury has a duty to decide one vay
or the other, such an appeal is designed to stir passion and can only distract a jury
from its actual duty: impartiality."); Carpintero v. United States, 398 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1968) (jury's duty is to consider and decide case on its merits).
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reducing the prosecution's burden of proof and resulting in a conviction based on the jury's outrage rather than its reasonable belief in
the defendant's guilt.
Having reached the conclusion that many of the elements of the
prosecutor's argument were improper, the next step of the analysis
is to determine whether the improprieties were sufficiently egregious
to warrant reversal. Casella's counsel failed to object, but instead
moved for a mistrial at the conclusion of the trial. Thus, as the Law
Court pointed out, the trial court's decision to deny the motion for
mistrial should be reviewed for abuse of discretion with reversal
warranted only if the trial court's denial was clearly erroneous.9 00
This high standard grants much deference to the trial judge and requires vacation of judgment only when the trial judge's ruling has
"plainly and unmistakably" done an injustice.29 1 The Law Court has
stated that a trial court should grant a mistrial only "in the rare
case when the trial cannot proceed to a fair result and no remedy
short of a new trial will satisfy the interests of justice."'' 9
In Casella, the trial judge, who had sat through the entire trial,
determined that a new trial was not warranted. In addition, the trial
judge included in his final instructions to the jury a "clear curative
instruction" addressing the jury's use of closing argument in their
deliberations.193 Despite these actions by the trial judge, the Law
Court's decision indicates that it found the trial judge's denial of the
motion for mistrial an abuse of discretion and that the error
prejudiced the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial.194 In reaching this decision, the court granted little deference to the presiding
judge who had the benefit of gauging the impact
of the prosecutor's
95
closing against the context of the entire trial.2
Under the abuse of discretion standard, it is difficult to identify
the clear palpable abuse of discretion or error of law in Casella that
would require review by the appellate court. As the dissent correctly
concludes, under the abuse of discretion standard, in light of the
tenor of the entire case, the appropriateness of the argument, and
the curative instruction given by the judge in his instructions to the
190. While the Law Court had previously reviewed cases where there was no objection under a preserved error standard, it has usually explained why it did so. See

supra notes 88 and 90.
191. Young v. Carignan, 152 Me. 332, 337, 129 A.2d 216, 218 (1957). See also 5
C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 772 (1993).
192. State v. Mason, 528 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Me. 1987).
193. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 125.

194. Id. at 123-24.
195. Previously the court has granted the judge much greater deference. See
supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also State v. Mason, 528 A.2d at 1260 (in
determining whether there is clear error, deference is given to the trial court's decision that curative instruction adequately protects against jury consideration of matters that the jury is instructed to disregard).
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jury, it was not an improper or erroneous exercise of the trial
court's
00

discretion to deny the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The majority's willingness to apply a standard that it otherwise
found difficult to satisfy and its preoccupation with quantifying the
prosecutor's misconduct suggests that the court's primary mission in
this case was to deter future misconduct rather than to ensure the
fairness of the trial. The Casella majority emphasized the persistent
nature of the prosecutor's description of the defendant as a liar.'"r If
the function of appellate review was to assure the fairness of
Casella's trial, the emphasis on whether a remark was made repeatedly would be irrelevant. The fact that a comment was made repeatedly or intentionally does not result in per se reversible error: a solitary comment could skew the fairness of a trial while a repeated
comment may have no effect. By highlighting the prosecutor's recurring impropriety it seems as if the court is attempting to establish
that the conduct was planned and intentional and, thus, that the
prosecutor should be sanctioned. 198 This analysis, and its underlying
purpose of vacating a conviction to "sanction" the prosecutor, gives
short shrift to the actual issue of whether the defendant was denied
a fair trial.
Application of the majority's analysis in Casella could have disastrous and unwanted consequences. The Law Court's opinion advances the theory that it is impermissible for the prosecutor even to
suggest that he believes the defendant has lied on the stand and
that any such statements will be closely scrutinized where "credibility is a crucial issue."'' 99 In any instance where the defendant testifies and denies the prosecution's case, credibility of the witnesses
takes center stage. Following the Law Court's reasoning, any statement by the prosecutor that draws the jury's attention to these inconsistencies would impermissibly suggest to the jury that the pros196. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 125 (Rudman, J., dissenting). But see State v.
Mart, 551 A.2d 456, 458 (Me. 1988) ("The court gave a full curative instruction concerning counsel's arguments as a part of its charge to the jury at the close of argument .... Because the curative instruction addressed the impropriety presented in
the State's closing argument, the ourt ... properly denied Marr's motion for mistrial.") (citing State v. Mason, 528 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Me. 1987)).
197. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 121 ("During his closing argument, the prosecutor, not less than forty-one times, asserted his opinion that Casella had lied. On at
least seven of those occasions, the prosecutor's view related to Casella's in-court
testimony.").
198. Richard G. Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-andHow
it Grew, 20 AL. L. REV.227, 270 (1968). Singer notes:
[I]t must be clearly understood that two separate and distinct points are
raised by every such case [of allegedly improper statements]: whether the
impropriety was planned, a question of the prosecutor's intent and good
faith; and whether, regardless of the motive of the prosecutor, the conduct
was in fact prejudicial to the defendant's rights.
199. State v. Casella, 632 A.2d at 123.
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ecutor believes the defendant's testimony was incredible. Tactically,
the unscrupulous defendant would benefit from taking the stand
and fabricating an alibi that the prosecutor, under the holdings of
Steen and Casella, would be unable to refute on cross-examination
or closing argument because it might suggest to the jury the prosecutor's belief that the defendant lied.
The Law Court could not have intended to introduce this dynamic
into the criminal trial process. The decisions discussed in Part II of
this Comment consistently sought to strike a balance between the
defendant's right to a fair trial and the prosecutor's duty to forcefully prosecute individuals indicted by the state's citizens. In
Casella, the Law Court skewed this balance by broadening the definition of personal opinion and falling to recognize actual errors in
the prosecutor's summation. The prosecutors' duty to ensure that a
defendant receives a fair trial should not mean that closing arguments must be cloaked in terms of "antiseptic neutrality.

' 20 0

Prose-

cutors may, without undermining the fundamental fairness of the
defendant's trial or their ethical obligations, comment on gross and
obvious falsities in the defendant's testimony.
C. State v. Tripp: FurtherLimits on ProsecutorialArgument
State v. Tripp20 1 again presented the Law Court with a case in
which the defendant claimed the prosecutor denied him a fair trial
through improper cross-examination and closing argument. In
Tripp, the defendant was charged with six counts of gross sexual
assault. 20 2 Like Casella and Steen before it, the credibility of the
witnesses was the controlling issue. The guilt or innocence of the
accused turned almost entirely on the jury's evaluation of the conflicting testimony of the defendant and the victim. The prosecutor
again highlighted these discrepancies to the jury in closing argument, but unlike the two cases previously discussed, defense counsel
failed to object or move for a mistrial. In this instance the Law
Court's review was limited to obvious error. 20 3 Despite this higher
200. United States v. Hunnewell, 891 F.2d 955, 957 (1st Cir. 1989), aff'd 923 F.2d
839 (1st Cir. 1990). See also Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I., Norfolk, 873
F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir.), ("no defendant is entitled to a wholly sanitized description of
the charged crime or to a prosecutorial summing-up confined to platitudes and euphemisms") cert. denied sub noma., Palmariello v. Butler, 493 U.S. 865 (1989).
201. 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994).
202. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993-1994) provides
in pertinent part:
1. A person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and:
B. The other person, not the actor's spouse, has not in fact attained the age
of 14 years.
203. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
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standard, the Law Court found the prosecutor's actions sufficient to
require reversal. Its decision reinforced its confused application of
the "personal opinion" label, and redefined the obvious error standard of review.
In Tripp, a father stood accused of six counts of gross sexual assault against his son.2 ' The prosecutor alleged that the assaults occurred over a three year period while the child was between five and
eight years of age. Aside from the victim's graphic testimony there
was no direct evidence and little circumstantial evidence corroborating the victim's accusations. 20 5 On direct examination the defendant
stated that his son's incriminations were false and resulted from the
boy's perception that the defendant had abandoned him.2

On

cross-examination the prosecutor asked the defendant a number of
questions about whether the victim was lying.20 During closing, the
prosecutor attempted to have the jury infer from the victim's sexually explicit testimony, which the prosecutor asserted would be foreign to a nine year old, that the victim's testimony was more credible than the defendant's testimony. In advancing this argument, the
prosecutor stated:
What this case boils down to is the testimony of that nine-yearold boy who sat there and took the oath to tell the truth and who
told you the truth. He told you what happened to him. He told you
what his father did to him. He told you in incredible detail. He
told you in detail, which I submit a child would not make up, a
child would not fantasize. A child would not imagine. He told you
things that a child would not lie about, a child would not be told to
204.
205.
206.
207.

State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1319.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1321 (Clifford, J. dissenting).
The prosecutor asked the following questions:

Q. You heard your son testify?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. It's your testimony that he is lying?

A. Yes.
Q. When he talked about being in the outhouse and standing on the toilet
seat with his hand up against the wall and your standing behind him he was
lying?
A. Never happened.
Q. He talked about white fuzzy stuff coming out of your penis. He was
lying?

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
in
A.
Q.
A.

Yes, sir.
He talked about throwing up. He was lying?
Yes, he was.
When he talked about the blood that he saw in the light of the flashlight
the car that was a lie?
Yes, sir.
So your son lied about all this?
Yes.

Id. at 1319 n.4.
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say, details of what happened.
I am going to talk about other evidence because that is
evidence in this case. I will come back and because it does all
down to [the victim] and Linwood Tripp, Sr., because one of
wasn't telling the truth. One of them was lying here to all of

other
come
them
us.2 °5

The prosecutor also suggested to the jury that when it set out to
determine what weight to accord each witness's testimony it should
consider who had the greater motivation to lie: the defendant, who
was facing conviction, or the victim.209
On appeal the defendant claimed that the improper questioning
as to the veracity of the witnesses and the prosecutor's prejudicial

closing argument constituted obvious error.2

10

The Law Court

211

agreed in a five-to-one decision. Relying on Steen, the court reiterated its holding that cross-examination that tries to push a defendant into saying other witnesses have lied is impermissible.2 12
While this premise seems sound, its application is even more tenuous here than in Steen. As the majority's opinion indicates, the
prosecutor did not "push" the defendant to say his son had lied. On
the contrary, the defendant had volunteered this defense on direct
examination. 213 For the same reasons indicated in the discussion of
Steen,21 4 the prosecutor's questioning was a proper attack on the
plausibility of the defendant's alibi and not an attempt to solicit an
unhelpful lay opinion.
208. Id. at 1319-20 n.5.
209. The prosecutor did this by presenting the jury with several rhetorical
questions:
Did you hear the Defendant suggest any reason why his son would lie about
these things? Did you hear him suggest any reason of how his son would
know about these things? How would the boy have lied? How would that
boy have know about these thing if they were not true? Why would he lie?
Why would the boy lie? Why would the defendant lie? It's pretty obvious
he's on trial here for a very serious crime. I submit to you that he has a very
large motive to lie to you.
Brief for Appellant at 28-29 n.4, State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994) (No. OXF93-205).
210. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1320.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. The majority opinion stated that, "[o]n direct examination defendant stated
that the events described by his son were not true." Id. A footnote to this assertion
contained the following excerpt from the defendant's direct examination:
Q. You heard the explicitness of the allegations that [the victim] has
made?
A. Yes.
Q. They are not true?
A. No they are not.
Id.
214. See supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text. See also ME. R. EVID. 611(b):
"A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case,
"
including credibility ....
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The court then turned to the issue of the prosecutor's closing argument. The Law Court found that by stating that "the nine yearold boy.., took the oath to tell you the truth and.. . told you the
truth" and then concluding this portion of the argument with "[o]ne
of them was lying here to all of us," the prosecutor implicitly told
the jury that "[he] believed that the victim told the truth and the
defendant had lied. 21 5 Because in the Law Court's estimation this
was a "close case" it found this assertion of "personal opinion" to be
21 6
serious obvious error.
In a lone dissent, Justice Clifford cautioned the court that reversal
for obvious error should be "exercised cautiously. 2 1 7 Believing that
the defense strategy had also capitalized on pitting the defendant's
credibility against the victim's, the dissent found that the defendant
should not be rewarded with a new trial when the prosecutor had
forcefully attacked this strategy and prevailed.2 18
Tripp presented the Law Court with an opportunity to stem its
emerging "personal opinion" doctrine and espouse proper and helpful limitations for the prosecutor that were consistent with earlier
Maine cases. The court could only reverse Tripp's conviction if the
error had worked a "manifest injustice" on the defendant's right to
a fair trial. Instead of finding improper expression of personal opinion, the court could have identified the problems in the prosecutor's
closing as argument of facts not in evidence and reprimanded the
prosecutor accordingly. The court could then have relied on the
jury's acquittal on three counts as an indication that there was no
deprivation of due process that rose to the level of obvious error.
The court did not take advantage of this opportunity to provide
prosecutors with more concrete standards. Instead, by focusing on
the prosecutor's conduct rather than the effect of the prosecutor's
conduct on the defendant's right to a fair trial and by misapplying
its prohibition on personal opinion, the court further restricted the
inferences that a prosecutor may raise when the defendant takes the
stand.
The Law Court in Tripp places the prosecutor in the impossible
position of being prohibited from commenting either directly or implicitly on a testifying defendant's credibility. By again improperly
applying State v. Smith,21 9 the court's holding prevents the prosecutor from ever characterizing or even suggesting that the defendant
who has testified is not credible. As in Casella and Steen, the defendant took the stand and directly contradicted the victim's testi215. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1321.
216. Id.

217. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 468 (Me.
1981)).
218. Id.
219. See supra note 136-38 and accompanying text.
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mony, turning the trial into a credibility contest. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor, to be an effective advocate, must have
the latitude to attack the defendant's credibility. Such an attack
does not represent an improper personal opinion, but rather a reasonable inference based on the conflicting testimony heard by the
jury. The court's finding that the prosecutor's comments rendered
the trial unfair represents a departure from its precedents allowing
the prosecutor to "strike hard blows" and underestimates the jury's
ability to evaluate the evidence and the statements of counsel.
The prosecution's closing in Tripp asked the jury to use its common sense to assess the credibility of witnesses in light of the
graphic testimony given by the victim and the defendant's vested
interest in securing an acquittal. The court's assertion that the prosecutor had vouched for the credibility of the victim by stating that
the victim had told the truth represents a conclusion that could only
be reached by a formalistic analysis that removes the statement
from the context of the trial. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals
pointed out, "this kind of issue is a melancholy one, for there is always an equally, or more effective, way of making a point.

'220

In this

case, the prosecutor's use of the word "truth," which is conclusory,
and thus problematic for the same reasons as "lie,'

22 1

was, at worst,

artless; it was not impermissible. It is difficult to see how the use of
a single phrase in the context of the entire closing argument rose to
the level of "serious obvious error." This is readily apparent if the
word "truth" is replaced by "story." If the prosecutor had said,
"What this case boils down to is the testimony of that nine-year-old
boy who sat there and took the oath to tell the truth and who told
you [his story]," the Law Court would be unable to say that the
prosecutor had asserted his personal opinion. It is just as probable
that the jury assigned this meaning to the prosecutor's actual remark. Contrary to its own precedent, 222 however, the Law Court assigned the most damaging meaning to the prosecutor's remark.
This is not to say the prosecutor's summation was faultless. Portions of the prosecutor's argument cited by the Law Court present a
different type of impropriety. It argues facts outside the record.
Aside from a detective who testified that it was not uncommon for
child sexual assault victims to present inconsistent portrayals of
their abuse, the jury heard no evidence concerning how this type of
abuse affects children, nor did they hear testimony regarding a nine
year old's awareness and understanding of sex.223 By arguing what a

child may or may not know about sex, the prosecutor, in the rest of
220. United States v. Gonzalez Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir. 1977).
221. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
223. Brief of Appellant at 22-24, State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318 (Me. 1994) (No.
OXF-93-205).
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this passage, is not offering a personal opinion, but an unsworn expert opinion concerning the victim. The Law Court has previously
held such argument improper, and sufficiently egregious to reverse
dependent
on the context of the remarks and the standard of
24
review.
Here the Law Court was reviewing the trial only for "obvious error." Reversal for "obvious error" is limited to errors that are
"blockbusters" which affect the fundamental fairness of the trial.22
In Tripp, the jury acquitted the defendant on three of the six gross
sexual assault counts against him. 220 Even if one concedes that the
prosecutor's conduct was improper, the acquittals indicate that the
jury objectively considered whether the state had proven each element of each count. Based on the three verdicts of acquittal, it is
unlikely that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's improper
in closing argument rose to the level of
questions and missteps
"manifest injustice.1227 Thus, in reaching its conclusion the Law
Court not only misapplied "personal opinion," but also redefined
and lowered the obvious error standard.22 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decisions in State v. Steen, State v. Casella, and State v.
Tripp make the line between "personal opinion" and proper argument based on reasonable inferences a moving target. Each case
presented the Law Court with a situation in which the defendant,
through his testimony, had made his credibility the trial's central
issue. In each decision, the Law Court further restricted the prosecutor's ability to raise inferences to the jury based on the defendant's testimony. In each successive case, faced with less egregious
conduct, and a higher standard of review, the Law Court reversed
the judgment of the trial court, leaving the state's prosecutors unsure of what statement in their next summation will serve as
grounds for reversal.
The prosecutor's task in a criminal trial is difficult enough with224. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
226. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d at 1319.
227. See, e.g., United States v. de Leon Davis, 914 F.2d 340, 345 (1st Cir. 1990)
(appellant's acquittal on one count supports the conclusion that the jury was not

influenced by the prosecutor's comment) (quoting United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488,
495 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., Andrad6s-Saings v. United States, 490
U.S. 1049 (1989)).

228. Compare the Law Court's result in State u. Tomah, supra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text with Tripp. In Tomah, like in Tripp, the defendant contended
that he was deprived a fair trial because the case turned on the jury's asessment of
the defendant's credibility and the prosecutor had expressed his "personal opinion."
The defendant did not object. Despite the numerous prosecutorial missteps detailed
by the Law Court, it found that they did not rise to the level of manifest injustice.
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out this added uncertainty. While prosecutors should not be permitted to use closing argument to hurl epithets at the defendant, the
court must permit them the leeway to forcefully advance the state's
position. The Law Court has a legitimate interest in limiting
prosecutorial argument, both to ensure the fairness of criminal defendant's trial and to secure prosecutorial compliance with standards of professional conduct. The court must recognize, however,
that, despite its frustration with prosecutors who have failed to heed
repeated warnings, vacating a defendant's conviction should be used
only in cases of egregious prosecutorial misconduct that deprives the
defendant of a fair trial. Vacating a conviction not only punishes the
prosecutor, but also burdens the entire criminal justice system by
imposing the cost of retrial. Moreover, disciplinary proceedings
under the Maine Bar Rules may provide a more individualized and
therefore more effective punishment.
The Law Court can best assist prosecutors in balancing the competing objectives of total fairness and zealous advocacy not by
merely sanctioning them but by enunciating lucid standards of conduct. The court can only produce such standards if it properly identifies the prosecutor's alleged misconduct and analyzes how the misconduct deprived the defendant a fair trial. This has not occurred in
the Law Court's recent decisions. Instead, one finds a mere statement that the prosecutor's offending remarks were "personal opinion" with a citation to cases which say the same thing without giving
any reasons. Such a mechanical application of the "personal opinion" label is inadequate and unhelpful.
The Law Court's willingness to reverse convictions for expressions
of "personal opinion" will no doubt force it to revisit this topic in
the near future.22 Before attaching the label "personal opinion" to
another closing argument, the Law Court should carefully analyze
the argument in light of its own substantial body of case law and the
context of the entire trial to determine if any part of the argument
is sustainable as a reasonable inference based on the evidence
presented. By providing a more thorough analysis of the prosecutor's impropriety the opinion would not only assist prosecutors and
trial judges in delineating the bounds of fairness, but also would

229. As this Comment readied for publication, defense attorneys in another highly
publicized criminal case, State v. Bennett, No. CUM-93-560 (Me. docketed Mar. 16,
1994), popularly known as the DeNan's murder case, prepared to appeal their clients'
convictions based on the prosecutor's closing argument. The appellants contend that
the prosecutor denied their clients a fair trial by appealing to the jury's fear and
presented the jury with his personal opinion which suggested defense witnesses were
lying. Jason Wolfe, Verdicts Appealed in Fatal Fight, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
March 17, 1994 at lB.
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make whatever sanction the court imposed more effective as the
court's expanded analysis would provide the prosecutor with a better understanding of the misconduct.
James W. Gunson

